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Directed by: W. Pitt Derryberry, Aaron Wichman, Andy Mienaltowski 
Department of Psychology                                                    Western Kentucky University 
 According to results from Aquino and Reed (study 5, 2002) and Hall and 
Derryberry (2010), high means and very low standard deviations of the average score for 
each question for both the internalization and symbolization scales of the Moral Identity 
Scale (MIS) are common.  This study attempts to measure the extent to which a person 
considers morality to be a central part of his or her self-concept.  Because participants 
may feel pressure to respond in a certain way on the MIS, the role of social desirability to 
respond favorably is very plausible. The current study, therefore, attempts to reduce 
socially desirable responding on the moral identity construct.   The hypothesis of this 
study was that the revised Moral Identity Scale—compared to the original Moral Identity 
Scale—would display a reduction in skewness, a reduction in social desirability effects, 
and an increase in the ability to predict moral functioning.  Analyses partially supported a 
reduction in social desirability and supported an increase in the ability to predict moral 
functioning.  However, analyses did not support a reduction in negative skewness.  
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Can Quantitative Assessment of Moral Identity Be Improved? 
 According to Augusto Blasi (1980; 1993), moral identity can be conceptualized as 
the cognitive schema a person holds about his or her moral character.  In other words, if a 
person’s self-definition is comprised of moral traits and characteristics, he or she should 
be motivated to behave in a way that is consistent with this self-conception.  As a result 
of Blasi’s pioneering work, the concept of moral identity has been a promising idea 
within the field of moral and developmental psychology.  According to Monin and Jordan 
(2009), the problem with the concept of moral identity, however, lies with how 
researchers in this domain have utilized many different methods of measurement.  As a 
result, researchers have failed to reach an agreement regarding how the construct should 
be defined and measured because the various approaches of moral identity measurement 
that Monin and Jordan identified have certain strengths and weaknesses.  The purpose 
here, then, is to review the literature regarding the history of moral identity measurement, 
discuss the pros and cons associated with different approaches pertaining to measuring 
moral identity, and provide a statement of the problem.  Ultimately, the current study was 
designed to revise the Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). 
The Moral Self 
 When an individual thinks about the concept of morality, he or she probably 
envisions an overt action or expression that would be objectively classified as moral 
behavior (Blasi, 1980).  According to Augusto Blasi, a moral behavior, which can be 
classified as an overt action or expression, must be viewed in terms of the unseen 
variables that are comprised of inner emotions, decision-making processes, feelings, 
cognitions, and judgments.  This, of course, makes the concept of morality very complex.  
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As a result of Blasi’s above-mentioned assertion that morality or moral behavior is 
comprised of numerous variables that cannot be witnessed overtly, many psychologists 
decided that it would be prudent to inquire into that which is unseen—those variables that 
lead to moral behavior or functioning (Derryberry, 2001).   
 According to Monin and Jordan (2009), Augusto Blasi’s pioneering research 
(1980; 1993; 1995) provided an alternative to theories of morality that focused entirely 
on moral judgment, moral reasoning, and their ostensible relationship to moral behavior.  
Specifically, in the nascent stages of research in this area of moral psychology, Blasi 
(1980) made apparent the major problem regarding the vague research hypotheses 
concerning moral cognitions or moral reasoning and their apparent association with 
moral action.  In other words, because researchers surmised a positive relationship 
between those two factors, other variables that affect the degree to which an individual is 
consistent in terms of engaging in moral endeavors needed to be addressed.  As such, the 
assumption of a moral motivator that links moral judgment, reasoning, and moral action 
had to be addressed. 
This postulation of a moral motivator between moral reasoning and moral action 
was revolutionary because, at this time, psychological measures designed to measure 
levels of Kohlbergian moral reasoning or judgment and their correlations with moral 
actions or functioning, for example, were inconsistent in terms of predicting moral 
behavior (Blasi, 1980; Walker & Frimer, 2007).  To state this more simply, some 
individuals who are not as advanced in terms of their moral reasoning level may still have 
a propensity to engage in moral behaviors without moral thoughts or cognitions (Blasi, 
1980; Colby & Damon, 1992; Walker & Frimer, 2007).  These findings, as a result, 
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fueled Blasi’s conjecture that moral motivation and moral self-consistency may unite the 
aforementioned factors of moral reasoning and moral functioning. 
In essence, Blasi (1980; 1993; 1995) identified a mental structure that could 
account for why some individuals feel motivated to engage in morally acceptable 
behavior, which he termed moral identity or one’s moral sense of self.  According to 
Blasi (1993), three underlying themes provide the basis for the existence of a moral 
identity: “moral understanding more reliably gives rise to moral action if it is translated 
into a judgment of personal responsibility; moral responsibility is the result of integrating 
morality in one’s identity or sense of self; from moral identity derives a psychological 
need to make one’s actions consistent with one’s ideals” (p. 99).  Furthermore, Blasi 
(1980) suggested that moral identity can be conceptualized as a cognitive schema, which 
provides a motivational link between moral judgment and moral action.  In other words, 
if an individual has a self-conception that includes moral traits and characteristics, he or 
she should be compelled to translate moral reasoning into moral action.  In essence, then, 
this identity is a powerful source of moral motivation because people generally desire to 
maintain self-consistency (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  Although moral identity is one of 
many identities that an individual has, it may or may not be important to one’s self-
concept.  Thus, Blasi’s work (1980; 1993) inspired other researchers to determine the 
manner in which an individual’s self-conception congregates around morality, which may 
relate to a propensity to behave ethically. 
Moral Identity Measurement  
 Throughout the history of moral identity measurement, researchers of moral 
identity or one’s moral sense of self have employed a personological-based approach 
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(Monin & Jordan, 2009).  In other words, moral psychologists who study this construct 
place great importance on the consistent individual differences among individuals whom 
people encounter within the environment.  Thus, one would expect to encounter much 
variability in terms of who is and who is not motivated by moral considerations and 
issues.  According to Monin and Jordan, this personological approach of studying moral 
identity can be broken down into two specific approaches.  The first approach, moral 
personality, advocates the identification of moral characteristics that may be shared by 
individuals who have a propensity to think and act in a morally consistent manner.  The 
second division of the personological approach, which is termed moral centrality, 
specifically focuses on quantitative measures that can assess the extent to which a person 
considers moral characteristics fundamental or central to his or her self-concept or 
identity (Monin & Jordan, 2009).  Each approach is reviewed below. 
Moral Personality Approach 
Researchers who adhere to the moral personality approach of studying moral 
identity are concerned with determining the extent to which some personality 
characteristics relate to moral functioning in terms of feeling, acting, and thinking in a 
morally consistent manner (Monin & Jordan, 2009).  In other words, because morally 
conscious individuals ostensibly share common characteristics, identifying and 
understanding those traits could provide valuable information to the research community 
in terms of helping promote a safe and caring environment in which every individual can 
live.  Thus, the moral personality approach seeks to identify those common moral traits, 
characteristics, or prototypes.  With regard to this approach, Monin and Jordan identified 
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two research methodologies on which scientists in this domain typically focus their 
research: Moral exemplar and Prototype method. 
The moral exemplar method is used by researchers who want to identify the 
specific personality characteristics that morally conscious individuals (e.g., a person who 
won an award for working with the homeless) share (Monin & Jordan, 2009).  According 
to Monin and Jordan, researchers who employ the exemplar methodology typically seek 
out those rare individuals who have been nominated or honored for their superior moral 
accolades.  As an example, if a person is nominated or recognized by a community 
organization or church for showing great concern for the homeless, he or she is the type 
of person with whom researchers in this domain would want to converse.  Overall, the 
goal is to determine the extent to which moral exemplars and regular people differ in 
terms of their perceived personality characteristics (Monin & Jordan, 2009).   
Monin and Jordan (2009) identified a number of researchers who have utilized 
this approach to researching the moral self.  These include Colby and Damon (1992) and 
Walker and Frimer (2007).  Although unaddressed by Monin and Jordan, research that 
Hart and Fegley (1995) and Monroe and Epperson (1994) conducted would also be 
considered to fall under this approach.  
To begin, a classic example of the exemplar methodology comes from Colby and 
Damon’s (1992) qualitative study of 23 moral exemplars, which was featured in their 
book Some Do Care.  In order to identify the people to whom moral considerations were 
important, the authors utilized twenty-two nominators who were experts in the field of 
morality.  After much deliberation among the group of individuals, five common themes 
were consistent in their descriptions of who would be considered a moral exemplar.  
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First, the moral exemplar would need to have a respect for all of humanity as opposed to 
just one group.  Second, the moral individual would have to have self-consistency in 
terms of translating moral ideals into moral action.  In other words, engaging in moral 
behavior is imperative.  This, ultimately, is consistent with Blasi’s (1980; 1993) 
definition of moral identity.  Third, the individual would have to have a propensity for 
moral behavior despite the negative consequences resulting from his or her actions.  For 
example, a negative outcry from societal groups or a substantial loss in financial gain 
would definitely constitute negative consequences.  Fourth, the individual would have to 
be an inspiration to others.  Finally, the individual would have to have the lack of or 
presence of no ego in terms of the person being humble about his or her contributions to 
society.  Overall, a diverse group of twenty-three moral exemplars who made significant 
advances in areas like poverty, education, and environmental preservation was identified 
and extensively interviewed for the purpose of understanding the moral personality in 
greater detail.  Overall, Colby and Damon (1992) concluded that the moral exemplars did 
not take into consideration the consequences following their helping other people (i.e., 
they had to help because they had no other choice), were certain about relating their goals 
to their internalized moral principles, had faith regardless of their dismal circumstances, 
had an appreciation for the ideas generated by their supporters, and had continuity in 
moral actions despite significant changes in their lives and living situations.  Overall, 
these individuals to whom moral exemplarity was paramount provided a crucial step in 
terms of understanding the moral personality.   
In the same vein, in order to understand extreme moral commitments, Hart and 
Fegley (1995) compared a group of fifteen morally conscious African American and 
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Latino youth from Camden, New Jersey who were nominated by community leaders and 
school officials for demonstrating altruistic behavior (e.g., working in a soup kitchen) 
with a comparison group of youth matched on age, gender, ethnicity, and neighborhood.  
Hart and colleagues surmised that understanding children who can thrive and be 
successful in such a detrimental environment (e.g., poverty and high crime rates) would 
prove fruitful in terms of understanding how moral action and behaviors can be sustained.   
Hart and Fegley (1995) utilized several extensive interviews that lasted from 4 to 
6 hours.  In these interviews, four characteristics of the self were examined: (1) 
attributions to self, (2) incorporations of parental ideals into the self-concept, (3) theories 
of self-concept, and (4) the continuity of past and future selves.  In terms of the first 
aspect, self-attributions refer to anything an individual considers to be part of the self 
(e.g., appearance, personality characteristics, and relationships with others).  The authors 
hypothesized that the care exemplar group would use more moral traits, characteristics, or 
goals to describe themselves than the comparison group.  Overall, the care exemplars’ 
descriptions were comprised of 7% moral attributes compared to 2% in the comparison 
group.   
In terms of the second aspect of the self, integration of parents and ideals into the 
self-concept refers to a hierarchical structure of the self that incorporates attributes from 
others like one’s parents or best friends.  According to Hart and colleagues, because 
evidence has shown that parents do have a strong influence with regard to a child’s moral 
development, it was hypothesized that the care exemplar group would have more self-
descriptions that integrate parental ideals (e.g., what I am like with my father) and fewer 
self-descriptions that integrate characteristics of friends than the comparison group.  
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Overall, it was found that 93% of the care exemplar group had self-descriptions that 
incorporated parental ideals compared to 60% in the comparison group.  Furthermore, 
because 80% of the comparison group used aspects of their best friend in their self-
descriptions compared to only 47% in the exemplar group, the additional hypothesis was 
also supported. 
Regarding the third aspect of the self, a theory of self refers to specific theories 
that an individual may have about him or herself (Hart & Fegley, 1995).  The authors 
stated that prior research has shown that there are three types of theories that youth and 
young adults use to describe themselves: level 1 is usually utilized by children; level 2 
theories of self are comprised of physical attributes and social awareness; level 3 theories 
of self are comprised of individuating one’s self from others; level 4 theories, which are 
the most advanced, are comprised of well-systematic beliefs, goals, and plans for the 
future.  Thus, it was hypothesized that the exemplar group would have more advanced 
theories of self than the comparison group.  Overall, this hypothesis was supported 
because half of the exemplars were reasoning at Level 4 compared to only one from the 
comparison group.  With regard to the last aspect, the understanding of the self from the 
past into the future refers to how one describes his or her past selves, actual selves, and 
future selves (Hart & Fegley, 1995).  Overall, the authors found that the descriptions of 
the actual selves of the exemplar group were essentially similar to their past and future 
selves.  On the other hand, the comparison group had dissimilar descriptions.   
Thus far, the findings from Colby and Damon (1992) and Hart and Fegley (1995) 
support the view that moral exemplars do share many distinct personality characteristics.  
For example, it seems that moral exemplarity entails a connection between personal goals 
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and moral actions, success despite harsh living conditions, an enhanced sense of 
empathy, and continuity in moral functioning across the life-span, respectively.   
Although moral exemplars seem to share many personality characteristics (Colby 
& Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995), a study conducted by Walker and Frimer (2007) 
examined whether different types of moral exemplars share these personality variables in 
addition to having unique characteristics specific to their exemplar group.  According to 
the authors, “a comparison of differing types of moral exemplarity can reveal both what 
is common to their personality functioning (and thus indicative of a personological core) 
and also what is unique (which would be suggestive of different kinds of moral 
excellence)” (p. 846).  In addition, the authors were concerned with the degree to which 
personality variables account for moral action because, as prior research has shown 
(Colby & Damon, 1992; Blasi; 1980; Hart & Fegley), stages of moral judgment only 
account for a limited amount of variance in terms of predicting moral action. As such, 
one’s moral sense of self or one’s moral identity may be multifaceted in nature, which 
may substantiate further the manner in which personality variables provide a motivational 
link that bridges the gap between moral judgment and moral action. 
Walker and Frimer (2007) utilized two lengthy self-report personality 
questionnaires and an extensive life-review interview in order to compare 50 Canadians 
who had been given medals for immense bravery or caring (25 in each group) and a 
comparison group of 50 Canadians matched on age, ethnicity, and gender.  The first 
questionnaire required the participants to rate on an 8-point Likert Scale the degree to 
which certain adjectives described themselves. The second questionnaire required the 
participants to provide a list of their personal strivings, which was used to assess the 
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degree to which distinct personality characteristics provide a motivational basis for one’s 
goals in life.  Finally, according to the authors, the semi-structured life-review interview 
was used for the purpose of having the participants “construct the story of their life” (p. 
849).  Ultimately, this interview is comprised of three different sections: (1) recollection 
of main chapters of one’s life with regard to childhood, adolescence, and adulthood; (2) 
recollection of impactful events in terms of high-points, low-points, turning-points, 
earliest memory, and most salient adult memory; (3) recollection of a moral dilemma, 
which is used to determine one’s stage of moral reasoning.  
In terms of the results, the first question was concerned with whether or not the 
two exemplar groups would differ from the matched comparison group.  As a result of 
extensive analyses, the authors concluded that the caring and brave exemplars—
compared to the control group—displayed significantly more agentic (i.e., ability to make 
responsible choices) and communal (i.e., viewing yourself as part of a community or 
humanity) themes in their life-narrative interviews.  In addition, the care and brave 
exemplar group reported having significantly more secure attachments as children, an 
absence of enemies, and an overall sense of optimism that pervaded their life stories.  The 
results from the two personality questionnaires were not as conclusive as the life-review 
interview because of inconsistent results.  As a result of these findings, the authors 
concluded that there is a general set of personality characteristics that are shared by all of 
those to whom morality is an important factor of life.   
With regard to the question concerning whether the two exemplar groups would 
have unique personality profiles, differences did exist in terms of which characteristics 
were associated with the caring exemplars and the brave exemplars (Walker & Frimer, 
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2007).  Specifically, the caring exemplar participants displayed more optimism in their 
life stories, and they scored higher on the dimensions of communion, secure attachments, 
intimacy strivings, and sensitivity to the plight of others.  Thus, according to the authors, 
these data do provide evidence for similar, yet specific personality dispositions. 
Finally, with regard to the question concerning whether personality variables 
provide a link between moral reasoning and moral action, the authors conducted two 
separate logistic regression analyses for each of the exemplar groups and found that the 
addition of personality variables to the equation in which moral reasoning scores were 
entered significantly improved the prediction of moral action (Walker & Frimer, 2007).  
According to Walker and Frimer, these findings provide support for the view that moral 
personalities can differ in terms what is central to self-concept.  
Overall, although these data from Walker and Frimer (2007) coincide with and 
substantiate previous research findings from Colby and Damon (1992) and Hart and 
Fegley (1995) regarding significant personality differences among moral exemplars and 
the general population, these data also provide support for differing moral personalities.  
As such, the notion of moral identity appears to be multifaceted in many respects. 
One final example of the exemplar methodology comes from a study conducted 
by Monroe and Epperson (1994) in which they interviewed, extensively, those people 
who assisted or did not assist the Jewish people during World War II.  The main purpose 
of this study was to determine whether rescuers and non-rescuers differed in the manner 
in which their cognitive frameworks were structured.  In order to identify those who 
rescued or provided assistance to the Jewish people, an Israeli agency founded for the 
purpose of honoring the rescuers and the victims of the Holocaust provided the 
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researchers with a database of rescuers who were still residing in the United States and 
Germany.  As a result, thirty individuals were randomly selected, and letters describing 
the nature of the study were subsequently sent.  Overall, fourteen rescuers participated in 
these lengthy interviews that ranged from three to 40 hours.  Additionally, this group of 
rescuers was compared with a group of non-rescuers who were matched on 
characteristics like age, nationality, religion, certain experiences that occurred during 
childhood, and socioeconomic status. 
In order to understand one’s cognitive-perceptual framework (i.e., the manner in 
which one perceives his or her self in relation to other people), the interviewers relied 
upon a qualitative analysis of the responses.  According to Monroe and Epperson (1994), 
“earlier work suggested the cognitive component provided a more useful predictor of 
ethical political behavior than did more traditional explanations, stressing individual 
background characteristics, cultural explanations, or situational factors” (p. 206).  As 
such, the authors surmised that quantitative analysis on which survey questionnaires are 
based would not be the appropriate method of measurement.   
Overall, Monroe and Epperson (1994) discovered that neither the rescuers nor the 
non-rescuers believed they had a choice to make.  In other words, although the rescuers 
and non-rescuers believed that they had no other choice to make with regard to behavior 
toward the Jews during World War II, both groups differed in explicit ways: the non-
rescuers viewed the world in terms of “us and them” (p. 224), and the rescuers viewed 
themselves as being part of all of humanity.  In essence, the rescuers considered all 
human beings to be equally important or equal in value.  Thus, a communal theme to life 
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seems to be a common distinction that separates those who are considered moral 
exemplars and those who are not. 
 As opposed to the moral exemplar methodology regarding the study of moral 
identity or the moral self, the moral prototype methodology is used by researchers who 
want to determine the personality characteristics that regular people consider moral 
(Monin & Jordan, 2009).  In other words, as opposed to an expert’s opinion regarding 
what is considered moral, this approach utilizes the conception of morality used by the 
layperson (Walker & Pitts, 1998).  In essence, this approach allows for greater 
generalizability in terms of what the general population considers to be moral.  According 
to Walker and Pitts, using preconceived definitions of morality, which are generally 
devised by moral psychologists, philosophers, or theologians, can limit one’s ability to 
better understand moral principles, ideals, and considerations.   
 Monin and Jordan (2009) identified a variety of researchers who utilized the 
moral prototype methodology.  These include Walker and Pitts (1998), Aquino and Reed 
(pilot studies 1 and 2, 2002), Lapsley and Lasky (studies 1, 2, and 3, 2001), and Walker 
and Hennig (2004).  Though not identified by Monin and Jordan, Walker (1999) also 
used this methodology.   
As an example of the prototype method, Walker and Pitts (1998) conducted three 
separate studies for the purpose of determining how the layperson describes and views 
people who are high in “moral, religious, and spiritual excellence” (p. 405).  The authors 
surmised that these three different types of exemplars would share personality 
characteristics in addition to having unique ones.  According to the Walker and Pitts, 
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utilizing conceptions from the general population would further elucidate the nature of 
moral character.   
With regard to study 1, a sample of 120 young, middle-aged, and older adults was 
asked to complete a questionnaire that required them to generate a list of characteristics 
that described a highly moral, spiritual, or religious individual (Walker & Pitts, 1998).  
According to the authors, 1,249 characteristics were generated for the moral individual, 
1,234 for the religious individual, and 1,440 were generated for the spiritual individual.  
A content analysis was done in order to eliminate synonymous or low frequency 
characteristics, which resulted in 91 traits for the moral individual and 110 traits for both 
the spiritual and religious individual.  Although each had unique characteristics, many of 
them were shared across the groups.  As such, these descriptor lists provided the basis for 
the second study: which characteristics are central or important to each person-concept 
and which ones are shared? 
In study 2, a separate sample of 120 young, middle-aged, and older adults was 
given a questionnaire (i.e., the descriptor lists from study 1) that asked them to rank on a 
7-point Likert scale the degree to which each of the descriptors was characteristic of a 
highly moral, religious, or spiritual individual (Walker & Pitts, 1998).  In terms of the 
results, it was discovered that the moral individual had 42 unique characteristics (e.g., 
just), 50 unique traits with regard to the religious individual (e.g., traditional), and 55 
unique traits for the spiritual individual (e.g., peaceful).  In addition, 17 traits were shared 
by both the religious and moral individuals (e.g., hard-working), 12 were shared by both 
the moral and spiritual individuals (e.g., truthful), and 23 traits were shared by both the 
religious and spiritual individuals (e.g., devout).  Finally, 20 personality characteristics 
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were shared by each of the three person-concepts (e.g., caring.)  According to the authors, 
because the spiritual and religious individuals have the most overlap in terms of 
personality characteristics, the moral person-concept can be seen as a similar, yet 
independent set of personality characteristics.  Moreover, because the personality traits of 
principled, integrity, and consistency were highly rated in terms of characterizing the 
moral individual, the research of Blasi (1980), Colby and Damon (1992), and Hart and 
Fegley (1995) was in accord with these findings in terms of moral self-consistency being 
an important factor for moral functioning.  Thus, the layperson does recognize that the 
moral personality is a distinct set of traits, which implies that the moral individual need 
not be highly religious or spiritual. 
Finally, study 3 was conducted in order to determine people’s implicit views 
regarding how they view highly moral, spiritual, or religious individuals.  A sample of 
180 undergraduate students was randomly assigned to a similarity-sort task group for 
each of the person-concepts utilized in studies 1 and 2.  In other words, this task required 
the participants to sort the top 50 prototypic characteristics into groups based on which 
traits were similar and dissimilar.  As a result of hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) and 
multidimensional scaling (MDS), separate clusters or categories and their underlying 
attributes were generated for each person-concept.  With regard to the moral person-
concept, six clusters were identified: principled-idealistic, dependable-loyal, has integrity, 
caring-trustworthy, fair, and confident.  In terms of the religious person-concept, these 
clusters or categories were also identified: active in church and life-devout, committed-
ethical, traditional, caring-trustworthy, steadfast, and dogmatic.  Finally, the spiritual 
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person-concept was comprised of these clusters, as follows: devout, committed, 
meditative, contented, trustworthy, and caring.   
According to Walker and Pitts (1998), these data from each of the three studies 
provide support for the notion that the personality of moral exemplars is distinctive from 
others.  As such, the authors concluded that the general conception of moral exemplars, 
which is garnered by the layperson, coincides with the attributes that the moral exemplars 
ascribed to themselves in the above-mentioned studies conducted by Colby and Damon 
(1992), Monroe and Epperson (1994), and Hart and Fegley (1995). 
Another notable example of the moral prototype methodology comes from the 
research conducted by Aquino and Reed (pilot studies 1 and 2, 2002) in which they 
sought to develop a measurement device that would reliably allow an individual to access 
his or her moral identity in order for him or her to rate the self-importance of it.  In order 
for participants to do this, the authors surmised that people would need to view traits or 
characteristics that have been proven empirically to be related to the layperson’s 
conception of a moral person.  Thus, Aquino and Reed utilized the prototype 
methodology to generate these moral characteristics. 
A sample of 116 male and 112 female undergraduate business students from the 
University of Delaware was utilized for the purpose of identifying traits or characteristics 
that would reliably activate one’s moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  First, the 
participants were asked to think about and write down a list of traits or characteristics that 
they thought would describe the personality of a moral individual.  As a result, 376 
“nonoverlapping moral traits, characteristics, or qualities” (p.1426) were identified.  
Next, the authors conducted a content analysis in order to combine similar traits.  
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Because 19 distinct traits were identified and because the authors wanted to precisely 
reduce the traits to ones that specifically activate one’s moral identity as opposed to a 
separate social identity, only those traits that were identified by 30% of the participants 
were kept.  These traits are, as follows: caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, 
helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind.  Because these traits were similar to the ones 
generated by actual moral exemplars (Colby & Damon, 1992; Monroe & Epperson, 1994; 
Hart & Fegley, 1995; Walker & Frimer, 2007) and were similar to the ones generated by 
laypeople who were asked to describe their conceptions of the moral personality (Walker 
& Pitts, 1998), the authors concluded that the traits had content validity.  However, in 
order to verify this further, Aquino and Reed conducted study 2 for the purpose of 
determining whether the nine traits were indeed content valid and would allow one to 
access his or her moral identity. 
A sample of three groups of individuals consisting of master’s of business 
administration (MBA) students from the University of Chicago, high school students 
from South Florida, and undergraduate students from the University of Delaware was 
given a questionnaire that asked them to read the nine traits identified from study 1 and 
rate, on a 5 point Likert-scale, the degree to which they considered each trait a necessary 
one for someone to possess in order to be considered a moral person (Aquino & Reed, 
2002).  In addition, two comparison traits (i.e., selfish and ruthless) and a neutral trait 
(i.e., distant) were also included.  Overall, because each of the nine moral traits—on 
average—was scored above the midpoint of the Likert-scale, the authors concluded that it 
was reasonable to include all of them as moral identity inducing stimuli.  Because each of 
the nine traits identified by the authors was validated by prior research noted above, the 
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prototype methodology seems to work well when one seeks to identify core personality 
characteristics that exemplify a moral individual. 
The four studies conducted by Lapsley and Lasky (2001), in which the 
layperson’s view regarding the moral personality was sought, also characterize well the 
moral prototype methodology.  However, studies 1, 2, and 3 will only be reviewed.  
Similar to the studies conducted by Walker and Pitts (studies 1 and 2, 1998) and Aquino 
and Reed (pilot studies 1 and 2, 2002) in which participants were required to generate a 
list of characteristics that describe a moral individual and subsequently rate the degree to 
which those traits were essential for one to be a moral person, the research done by 
Lapsley and Lasky (studies 1 and 2) followed suit.  Additionally, study 3 was utilized to 
assess the degree to which recognition and recall memory would support a moral 
prototype. 
Regarding study 1, a sample of 73 undergraduate and graduate students from a 
large regional university located in the Midwest was given instructions that asked them to 
generate characteristics describing someone who has “good character” (p. 349).  
Additionally, the participants were asked to keep their responses to a minimum of 20 
separate lines.  Overall, a content analysis identified 175 distinct adjectives regarding 
traits describing a person who has good character.  As a result of the traits identified in 
study 1, study 2 was designed to determine which traits were and were not indicative of a 
moral prototype (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001).  As such, 121 participants were presented with 
a randomized list of the traits that were identified in study 1 and asked to rate on a 7-point 
Likert scale, which ranged from 1 (almost never true) to 7 (almost always true), the 
degree to which the traits described someone who has good character.  Because these 
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traits would be used in study 3, the 20 highest rated traits (e.g., caring, moral, honest, 
responsible) and the 20 lowest rated traits (e.g., lucky, clean, patriotic, popular) were kept 
and identified as prototypic and nonprototypic of good character. 
Lapsley and Lasky (2001) conducted study 3 for the purpose of determining 
whether a false recognition and recall memory task would also support the notion that 
there is a cognitive prototype associated with moral character.  The authors surmised that 
the participants would falsely recognize more prototypic than nonprototypic 
characteristics that were not shown at the learning phase and equally recall presented 
prototypic traits and presented nonprototypic traits, which would support their hypothesis 
regarding the moral prototype and the way in which it influences information processing.   
Eighty participants who were similar to the ones utilized in studies 1 and 2 in 
terms of demographics were presented with a memory test (Lapsley & Lasky, 2001).  In 
the acquisition phase, the participants were given a questionnaire that contained 20 
statements describing a person called “Pat.”  Whereas 10 statements described Pat as an 
individual with good character (i.e., prototypic traits), the other ten described him using 
nonprototypic traits.  Each of the statements was presented on one page in random order, 
which was subsequently followed by a tone that signaled the participants to switch to the 
next page.  After this was done, the participants were required to engage in tasks that 
measured recall and recognition memory.  In terms of the recall task, the participants 
were asked to verbally state every single statement that they could remember.  According 
to the authors, no significant differences in terms of recall memory were expected with 
the presented items.  With regard to the recognition task, the participants were shown 40 
statements, which were comprised of 20 presented statements (i.e., 10 prototypic and 10 
 20 
 
nonprototypic traits) and 20 statements that were not shown (i.e., 10 prototypic and 10 
nonprototypic traits).  As stated above, the authors hypothesized that significant 
differences would be found in terms of the participants falsely recognizing more 
prototypic traits that were not shown compared to nonprototypic traits that were not 
shown.   
Overall, Lapsley and Lasky (2001) supported each of the abovementioned 
hypotheses.  In terms of the recall task, there were no significant differences concerning 
recall memory when the participants were asked to verbally state presented prototypic 
and nonprototypic traits.  On the other hand, the authors found a significant difference in 
terms of the participants falsely claiming that they had seen more nonpresented 
prototypic traits compared to nonpresented nonprototypic traits.  According to the 
authors, these data “suggest that at least some morally relevant psychological processes 
are implicit, spontaneous, and automatic and that the conditions and consequences of 
prototype knowledge activation will have to play a role in understanding moral 
information processing” (p. 357).  Ultimately, these data from Lapsley and Lasky support 
the findings from Walker and Pitts (1998) and Aquino and Reed (studies 1 and 2) 
concerning the notion that moral character can congregate around a set of distinct 
personality characteristics that are generated by the layperson, which may be understood 
and expressed implicitly or understood and expressed explicitly.   
A moral prototype methodology also characterizes the 3 studies conducted by 
Walker and Hennig (2004) in which they sought to substantiate and extend previous 
findings (Walker & Pitts, 1998; Lapsley & Lasky, studies 1, 2, and 3, 2001; Aquino & 
Reed, studies 1 and 2, 2002) regarding the manner in which the average person produces 
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and rates personality characteristics related to his or her conception of the moral agent.  
More specifically, this study attempted to determine whether different types of moral 
personalities (i.e., just, brave, and caring) share personality characteristics that are 
generated by the layperson in addition to having unique ones, which is similar to the 
Walker and Frimer (2007) study in which they used the moral exemplar approach to 
answer a similar question.  Ultimately, the goal was to determine, conclusively, whether 
there was more than a single moral prototype.  Unlike Aquino and Reed (studies 1 and 2, 
2002) and Lapsley and Lasky (studies 1 and 2, 2001), however, Walker and Hennig 
utilized a similarity-sorting procedure from Walker and Pitts (study 3, 1998) in order to 
understand better the extent to which moral conceptions are understood implicitly.   
In study 1, a sample of 805 young, middle-aged, and older adults was randomly 
assigned to a just, brave, or caring personality group that required them to generate 
personality characteristics describing each (Walker & Hennig, 2004).  The goal, 
according to the authors, was to examine the traits that are characteristic of each, which 
would be “suggestive of the core of morality” (p. 631).  This procedure produced 3,309 
traits for the just personality, 2,873 for the brave personality, and 3,208 for the caring 
personality.  Similar to the studies conducted by Aquino and Reed (study 1, 2001), 
Lapsley and Lasky (study 1, 2001), and Walker and Pitts (study 1, 1998), a content 
analysis that combined similar traits and removed low-frequency traits was utilized in 
order to reduce the data.  Overall, there were 113, 120, and 103 traits related to the just, 
brave, and caring personalities, and 50 unique traits for the just personality (e.g., has 
integrity, reasonable), 67 for the brave personality (e.g., heroic, faces danger), and 47 for 
the caring personality (e.g., good-hearted, nurturing).  In addition, 15 traits were shared 
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between the just and brave personalities (e.g., honorable, courageous), 18 between the 
just and caring personalities (e.g., good listener, fair), and 8 between the brave and caring 
personalities (e.g., self-sacrificial, altruistic.  Moreover, 30 traits were shared among each 
of the three types of personalities (e.g., moral, honest, empathic, humble, and optimistic).  
According to the authors, themes of “communal emotionality” (p. 632) and “personal 
agency” (p. 632) were replete within each of the three personalities, which demonstrates 
separate, yet similar personality characteristics.   
Regarding study 2, a sample of 401 undergraduate students was randomly 
assigned to a just, brave, and caring group in order for them to rank on an 8-point Likert 
scale, which ranged from 1 being extremely inaccurate and 8 being extremely accurate, 
the degree to which the descriptor traits identified in study 1 were characteristic of each 
of the moral personalities (Walker & Hennig, 2004).  In addition, 124 items from a 
personality inventory (i.e., Five-Factor Model of Personality) that measures extroversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience) were 
also used for the purpose of generating a personality profile for each type of moral 
personality.  Thus, the goal for this study was to extrapolate from the data a personality 
profile for each exemplar in addition to examining the relations among them. 
First, in terms of the prototypicality ratings, the attributes identified in study 1 
were deemed appropriate with regard to each moral personality.  In other words, a 
majority of the traits for each exemplar were rated as quite accurate (i.e., a rating of 6) to 
extremely accurate (i.e., a rating of 8), which substantiates the finding from study 1 
concerning the multifaceted nature of a moral prototype. Second, with regard to the 
relations among the moral personalities, it was discovered that just exemplar had higher 
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ratings regarding the traits than those traits shared with the caring or brave personality.  
According to the authors, these data provide evidence for a similar, yet independent 
moral personality.   
It was also found that the unique descriptors regarding the brave exemplar had 
higher ratings than those descriptors that were shared with the just and caring exemplar, 
which implies that the brave personality is also similar, yet distinct from the other 
personalities.  Additionally, it was discovered that the caring exemplar or caring 
personality was moderately associated with the other person-concepts.  In addition, it was 
found that the trait moral was highly associated with the just personality, followed by the 
caring personality, and finally followed by the brave personality.   
The final analysis in study 2 focused on the personality profiles for each moral 
personality (Walker & Hennig, 2004).  These profiles were generated and examined with 
the Five-Factor Model of Personality (i.e., extroversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience) and their underlying 
attributes.  First, the caring personality was associated with “warm, agreeable, nurturing, 
and sympathetic” (p. 637).  Second, the brave exemplar or personality was associated 
with being agentic, forceful, self-confident, friendly, and sociable.  Finally, the just 
personality was associated with dependable, organized, open-minded, questioning, and 
reflective.  In terms of these underlying attributes related to the Five-Factor Model of 
Personality, “the just exemplar was characterized predominantly by Conscientiousness 
and Openness, the brave exemplar by dominance/Extraversion, and the caring exemplar 
by nurturance/Agreeableness” (p. 643).  As such, the authors concluded that these data 
provide evidence for differing conceptions of moral exemplarity. 
 24 
 
Finally, a sample of 240 undergraduate students participated in study 3 for the 
purpose of determining whether moral conceptions are understood implicitly in terms of 
moral typologies (Walker & Hennig, 2004).  The participants were asked to participate in 
a similarity-sorting task, which required them to be randomly assigned to a brave, caring, 
or just exemplar group and sort 60 descriptors traits based on which ones they thought 
were similar or different from one another.  A combination of Multidimensional scaling 
(MDS) and Hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) revealed clusters of attributes with 
underlying traits related to each moral personality.  For the just exemplar, 5 dimensions 
and underlying traits for each were revealed: rational (e.g., logical, intelligent), 
conscientious (e.g., responsible, consistent), honest (e.g., truthful, sincere), and principled 
(e.g., moral, ethical), and fair (e.g., listens to all sides, non-discriminatory).  In terms of 
the brave exemplar, 5 dimensions and underlying characteristics were also revealed: 
dedicated (e.g., driven, ambitious), intrepid (e.g., fearless, faces danger), self-sacrificial 
(e.g., willing, noble) heroic-strong (e.g., bold, gallant), and confident (e.g., assertive, 
secure).  Finally, three dimensions and underlying attributes were generated with regard 
to the caring exemplar: loving-empathic (e.g., tender, compassionate), honest-dependable 
(e.g., honest, moral), and altruistic (e.g., generous, charitable).   
According to Walker and Hennig (2004), the data obtained from studies 1, 2, and 
3 provide support for the notion that different types of moral exemplars (i.e., brave, 
caring, and just) have similar and unique personality dispositions.  Although this, of 
course, is the layperson’s view regarding what he or she considers moral exemplarity, the 
findings from this study support the research conducted by Walker and Frimer (2007) in 
which they concluded that actual moral exemplars describe themselves in similar and 
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distinct ways.  As such, it seems that the moral personality is multifaceted in nature as 
opposed to singular and concrete. 
 A final example of the moral prototype methodology comes from the Walker 
(1999) study in which he sought to determine the extent to which participants’ 
descriptions of moral, spiritual, and religious exemplars would differ.  More specifically, 
similar to the Walker and Hennig (2004) studies in which they tried to determine the 
perceived personality profiles of brave, caring, and just exemplars by utilizing analyses 
that examined the Five-Factor Model of Personality in terms of comparing those 
dimensions with traits generated by participants, Walker (1999) also took this 
methodology into consideration. 
A sample of 120 young, middle-aged, and older adults who were recruited from 
undergraduate classes and personal contacts was collectively asked to complete a 
questionnaire requiring their generating of characteristics that they thought would 
characterize the personality dispositions of moral, religious, and spiritual individuals 
(Walker, 1999).  These descriptions, in turn, were then entered into a program that 
identified valid personality attributes for the purpose of relating them to attributes 
associated with the Big-Five personality factors (i.e., extroversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experience).  The participants 
produced characteristics for each exemplar, which were then subsequently compared and 
analyzed with the Five-Factor Model of Personality and its underlying attributes related 
to each factor.   
In terms of the generated attributes and their relations to the Five-Factor Model of 
Personality, several primary distinctions and similarities among the three exemplars were 
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revealed (Walker, 1999).  First, in terms of the moral exemplar, it was discovered that the 
most positive characteristics were related to the Conscientiousness (e.g., trustworthy, 
ethical, responsible) and Agreeableness (e.g., caring, kind, helpful) factors, with no 
significant differences in terms of the other three factors.  Additionally, the undesirable 
characteristics were related to the Agreeableness (e.g., stubborn, critical) and Open to 
Experience (e.g., rigid, inflexible) factors, with few traits relating to the other factors.   
Regarding the spiritual exemplar, the most positive characteristics were related to 
the Agreeableness (e.g., loving, caring, kind), Openness (e.g., reflective, aware, 
introspective), and Conscientiousness (e.g., moral, devoted, truthful) factors, with the 
other two factors being less prominent in terms of significant differences (Walker, 1998).  
With regard to negative characteristics, it was discovered that the Extroversion factor was 
the most prominent when compared to the other four factors. 
Finally, with regard to the religious exemplar, the most positive characteristics 
were associated with Conscientiousness (e.g., faithful, moral, disciplined) and 
Agreeableness (e.g., kind, accepting, helpful) (Walker, 1998).  In terms of undesirable 
traits, the authors discovered that a majority of the traits were associated with Openness 
(e.g., rigid, conservative) and Agreeableness (e.g., self-righteous, authoritarian), with 
very few terms being related to the other three factors.  These findings from Walker 
(1999) substantiate and extend previous findings from Walker and Pitts (1998) and 
Walker and Hennig (2004) in terms of providing additional evidence regarding the 
average person’s view of divergent moral personalities or prototypes. 
As opposed to the exemplar methodology, which is focused on discovering the 
unique personality dispositions that characterize actual moral exemplars, the prototype 
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methodology attempts to address and examine the comprehensive depiction of the moral 
personality in terms of the specific culture from which an individual comes (Monin & 
Jordan, 2009).  According to Monin and Jordan (2009), “These two methods address 
related questions insofar as individuals are likely recognized by their community as moral 
leaders (and thus studied by students of the exemplar approach) to the extent that they 
match the templates associated with the moral ideal in their culture (as documented by 
proponents of the prototype approach)” (p. 6-7).      
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Moral Personality Approach 
In reviewing the aforementioned work comprising the Moral Personality 
approach, it seems that there are various strengths and weaknesses that should be 
addressed.  An important strength appears to be the “top down” approach that it uses.  In 
other words, this approach starts with the end in mind in terms of trying to understand the 
manner in which prior experience, cognitions, and knowledge guide a moral individual’s 
behavior.  Classic examples that elucidate this strength further come from the studies 
conducted by Monroe and Epperson (1994), Colby and Damon (1992), Hart and Fegley 
(1995) and Walker and Frimer (2007) in which they sought to understand the life stories, 
cognitions, and underlying reasons regarding why people display moral exemplarity 
despite troubling circumstances and unique circumstances that may disrupt or alter their 
lives.  In essence, this approach utilizes those who are high in moral functioning as 
opposed to those who are not.   
A second strength is that certain findings support the possibility that this construct 
could be multifaceted.  Because, it has never been resolved as to whether moral identity 
is dispositional, situational, or developmental, the research conducted by Walker and 
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Frimer (2007) examining those nominated for acts of care and those nominated for acts of 
heroism shows that differences do indeed exist in terms of the caring exemplars 
exhibiting significantly more optimistic themes in their life stories.  In addition, the 
caring exemplars scored higher on dimensions of communion, secure attachments, 
intimacy, and sensitivity regarding the plight of other individuals.  Another piece of 
evidence that supports the notion regarding the multifaceted view of moral exemplarity 
comes from Walker and Hennig (study 2, 2004), which examined the profiles for three 
different moral exemplars.  To begin, the caring exemplar was seen as warm, agreeable, 
nurturing, and sympathetic.  Next, the brave exemplar was viewed as being agentic, 
forceful, self-confident, friendly, and sociable.  Finally, the just exemplar was associated 
with dependable, organized, open-minded, questioning, and reflective traits.  In addition, 
the research from Walker and Pitts (1998) and Walker (1999) also supported the view 
that highly moral, spiritual, or religious individuals are perceived to have similar, yet 
distinct personalities.  Unlike Lapsley and Lasky (2001) who considered the possibility 
that the moral personality may be singular as opposed to multifaceted, the 
abovementioned research demonstrates that morality may be extant within many different 
types of personality dispositions. 
A third strength is that the notion of a moral prototype does seem feasible.  The 
research of Walker (1999), Walker and Pitts (1998), Lapsley and Laskey (2001), and 
Aquino and Reed (studies 1 and 2, 2002) has demonstrated, through the use of free listing 
procedures that require the participants to generate traits that they think describe a moral 
individual, how laypersons have a general understanding that there are advanced moral 
identities or personalities that are fundamentally distinct from their own.  First, Walker 
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(1999) discovered that the moral exemplar prototype was seen as being trustworthy, 
ethical, responsible, caring, kind, and helpful. Second. Walker and Pitts (1998) also 
discovered that the moral person-concept was viewed as being principled, dependable, 
caring, trustworthy, fair, and confident.  Third, as a result of Laspsley and Lasky (2001) 
asking participants to describe someone who has good character, these traits, for 
example, were identified: caring, moral, honest, and responsible.  Finally, Aquino and 
Reed (studies 1 and 2) had participants think about and write down characteristics that 
they thought would describe the personality of a moral individual.  As a result, these 
traits were ultimately identified:  caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, 
hardworking, honest, and kind.  Although there seems to be a plethora of evidence 
regarding the multifaceted nature of an advanced moral identity (e.g., moral exemplar, 
caring, exemplar, brave exemplar, spiritual exemplar, religious exemplar, just exemplar), 
the average person does seem to produce similar personality characteristics when 
required to describe one who is specifically a moral exemplar. 
 A final strength is that identifying the signature personality profile of the moral 
individual could guide moral education and educational practice in general.  In essence, 
the integration and understanding of the moral self within various psychological models 
of development and cognition may help to increase the effectiveness of moral education.  
Lapsley (2008) stated that the integration of additional models within the moral self will 
ultimately help schools, families, and communities foster the proper development of 
morality.  Additionally, he also stated that children will encounter situations that are 
morally significant.  Thus, parental techniques, for example, should include helping 
children identify which events are related to morally accepted norms and values. 
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In terms of some of the weaknesses related to this approach of moral identity 
measurement, three need to be given consideration.  First, this approach is extremely time 
consuming in terms of using interview-based methods for identifying moral and non-
moral individuals.  Because the interviewing process can last many hours or many days, 
participant fatigue and the high cost of conducting research could have implications 
where the results are concerned.  Second, highly complex analyses from both quantitative 
and qualitative traditions are required.  Furthermore, there is much variability in terms of 
interview protocols.  In other words, there is not a standardized method that is utilized by 
researchers who adhere to this approach of moral identity measurement.   
Moral Centrality Approach: Moral Self-Importance 
 According to Monin and Jordan (2009), the moral centrality approach deals with 
the perceived self-importance of moral concerns.  As such, Monin and Jordan considered 
that this approach to moral identity measurement has been influenced by the research of 
Blasi (1980; 1993; 1995), who sought to explain how moral concerns become central to 
and prioritized by self-concept and self-understanding.  Hence, Blasi was not just looking 
to identify those who possessed moral characteristics.  Instead, he sought to study those 
whose lives were synonymous with moral concerns.  In other words, he was looking for 
how individuals’ lives and moral concerns were synonymous; in essence, moral values 
and behaviors were not just characteristics or extensions of self—they were self. 
 Monin and Jordan (2009) regarded the joint efforts of Karl Aquino and Americus 
Reed as a fundamental example of the moral centrality approach.  Aquino and Reed 
(2002) sought to extend Blasi’s seminal work (1980; 1993; 1995) by studying the self-
importance participants attributed to moral identity.  Similar to Blasi (1980; 1993; 1995), 
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Aquino and Reed presumed that greater importance attributed by the self to such a 
construct would ultimately increase the likelihood that moral reasoning would translate to 
moral action.  Ultimately, Aquino and Reed created a measure of the self-importance of 
moral identity, called the Moral Identity Scale (MIS).  Given the MIS’s role in advancing 
the moral centrality approach, more details regarding the scale follow.    
 The MIS is comprised of two factors relating to moral identity, with five 
questions corresponding to each (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  The internalization scale 
addresses the extent to which one values moral traits, and the symbolization scale seeks 
to identify whether one’s actions demonstrate a commitment to moral self-expression or 
commitment (e.g., group membership, activities considered moral).  First, participants are 
asked to review nine characteristics that may exemplify one who has a propensity for 
moral action.  These characteristics include caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, 
generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind.  Aquino and Reed (2002, pilot studies 
1 and 2) capitalized on the moral prototype approach as a means for identifying these 
characteristics.  Similar to the participants in other studies conducted by Walker and Pitts 
(1998), Walker (1999), Lapsley and Lasky (2001) and Walker and Hennig (2004), the 
participants in the pilot studies (1 and 2) in which the MIS was developed did indeed 
generate similar characteristics (e.g., caring, honest, compassionate) related to a moral 
prototype when asked to participate in a free listing procedure task. Second, a 
visualization task is done in which participants are asked to imagine how a person with 
these traits would feel, act, and think.  Because moral identity is one of the many 
identities that people have, the visualization task regarding thinking about a person who 
has these characteristics is essential to the measure because it makes one’s moral identity 
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accessible at that time, which would allow one to possibly rate the self-importance of that 
specific identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  According to the authors, these traits cause a 
“spreading activation” (p. 1424) in terms of activating other moral traits in the cognitive 
network.  Finally, participants answer each of the 10 questions on a 5-point Likert scale, 
with 1 meaning strongly disagree and 5 meaning strongly agree. Examples of questions 
from the internalization and symbolization scale are as follows:  ‘‘It would make me feel 
good to be a person who has these characteristics’’ and ‘‘I am actively involved in 
activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics,’’ respectively 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1428).  Ultimately, this measure is used to predict behavioral 
intentions, actual behaviors, or moral cognitions as Aquino and Reed supported with 
subsequent studies that they included in their 2002 publication. 
 Notable Research using the Moral Identity Scale 
 During the development of the Moral Identity Scale, Aquino and Reed (2002, 
studies 4, 5 and 6) sought to determine whether the scale would be predictive of moral 
cognitions and behavior.  In order to determine whether the scale would be predictive of 
moral cognitions or a “moral spontaneous self-concept” (p. 1432), the authors utilized in 
study 4 a sample of 160 South Florida high school students to answer this question.  First, 
the participants were asked to complete the Moral Identity Scale at time 1.  After two 
months, the same participants were given seven weekly writing assignments, one of 
which required the students to answer the following question: “How would you describe 
yourself—discuss who you are as a person, what is important to you and what qualities or 
characteristics do you like/dislike about yourself” (p. 1433).   
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The authors discovered that higher scores on both the internalization (M = 4.0, SD 
= 0.7, r = .39, p < .001) and symbolization (M = 3.0, SD = 0.7, r = .28, p < .001) 
dimensions of the MIS were significantly correlated with judges’ ratings of whether the 
students’ self-descriptions contained moral traits and characteristics (Aquino & Reed, 
2002).  In addition, binary logistic and regression analyses provided further evidence for 
the predictive validity of the MIS scales. 
In order to determine whether the MIS would have significant correlations with 
self-reported volunteer behavior and intrinsic satisfaction regarding those moral 
behaviors, study 5 utilized a sample of 300 University of Delaware alumni.  They were 
was asked to complete the MIS and answer a “yes” or “no” question regarding whether 
they have participated in activities that benefit humanity (e.g., mentoring, working at a 
food shelter, etc.) within the last two years (Aquino & Reed, 2002). In addition, if the 
participants had answered “yes” to the prior question, they were then asked to rate these 3 
questions on a 5-point Likert (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) scale: the degree 
to which they had intrinsic satisfaction while engaging in volunteer activities; the degree 
to which their participating was voluntary; and the degree to which they felt involved.   
In terms of the first analysis, Aquino and Reed (2002) found that both the 
internalization (M = 4.58, SD = 0.42, r = .19, p < .01) and symbolization (M = 3.12, SD = 
0.69, r = .23, p < .001) scales were positively and significantly correlated with self-
reported volunteerism.  Second, the authors also discovered that symbolization (M = 3.12, 
SD = 0.69, r = .26, p < .001) was positively and significantly correlated with intrinsic 
satisfaction regarding participation in volunteer activities.  Third, both internalization (M 
= 4.58, SD = 0.42, r = .38, p < .001) and symbolization (M = 3.12, SD = 0.69, r = .20, p 
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< .01) were also found to be positively related to perceived freedom in terms of whether 
the volunteer behaviors were voluntary.  Finally, Aquino and Reed found that the 
symbolization (M = 3.12, SD = 0.69, r = .33, p < .01) scale was positively correlated with 
the degree to which the participants felt involved when participating in volunteer 
activities.  Similar to study 4, binary logistic and regression analyses also generated 
further evidence in terms of the predictive ability of the MIS. 
Finally, Aquino and Reed (2002) conducted study 6 in order to conclude whether 
or not the MIS could count for actual donation behavior and the size of the donation.  A 
sample of 160 high school students, who were described in study 4, was given an 
opportunity to participate in a food drive.  Three months after the participants had 
completed the MIS and 1 month after they had completed the seven weekly writing 
assignments, the students’ teacher organized a food drive and recorded whether or not 
each student donated canned goods.  In addition, the teacher also counted the number of 
cans donated by each student.  Overall, the internalization (M = 4.05, SD = 0.67, r = .25, 
p < .01) scale was positively correlated with actual donation behavior and the number of 
cans donated (M = 4.05, SD = 0.67, r = .28, p < .01).  Additionally, binary logistic and 
regression analyses also supported the predictive validity of the MIS.  As a result of these 
promising findings from these studies, many other researchers decided to utilize the MIS 
in their research endeavors.   
 Other researchers have yielded notable findings with the MIS.  An extremely 
succinct review of each will be provided.  For instance, Hall and Derryberry (2010) 
utilized a sample of 120 undergraduate students from a large Southeastern university in 
order to determine whether or not significant differences would exist between explicit 
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racists and a low prejudice group in terms of various constructs like moral identity.  They 
found that the internalization and symbolization scores of the MIS were significantly 
lower for a highly explicit racial prejudice group compared to a low overall prejudice 
group.  In other words, those to whom morality is important were less likely to be 
explicitly racist.  Thus, this result does provide additional evidence for the validity of the 
measure.   
Reed, Aquino, and Levy (study 1a, 2007) utilized a sample of 242 undergraduate 
students, administration workers, and community residents for the purpose of 
determining perceptions of charitable acts in terms of whether giving money or time was 
considered more moral.  The researchers used the MIS, and they utilized a scale that 
measures the extent to which a person believes giving time or money to a charitable 
organization is more moral or charitable. The authors discovered that participants who 
scored highly on the internalization measure of the MIS were more likely to state that the 
giving of one’s time to volunteer in various charitable endeavors was more moral, caring, 
heartfelt, and self-expressive than just giving money to that particular group or 
organization.   
Further evidence for the validity of the measure comes from Reed and Aquino 
(study 1, 2003) in which they sought to determine the extent to which one’s moral 
identity would be related to one’s perceived moral obligation toward out-group members 
of society.  In study 1, a sample of 137 undergraduate students enrolled in a marketing 
class at a northeastern university located in the United States was used.  The researchers 
utilized the MIS, and they also utilized several questionnaires designed to assess 
perceived obligation to show concern for discriminated groups of people.  The authors 
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discovered that higher scores on the internalization measure of the MIS were significantly 
correlated with more positive beliefs regarding relief efforts and help aimed at providing 
much needed aid to out-group members of our society. 
One last important finding regarding the utilization of the MIS comes from the 
Sage, Kavussanu, and Duda (2006) study in which they sought to examine the extent to 
which one’s moral identity might predict prosocial and antisocial behaviors in soccer.  A 
sample of 210 recreational and professional male soccer players was used in this study.  
The authors found that professional soccer players who scored higher on the 
internalization measure of the scale were more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors 
and less likely to engage in antisocial behaviors (e.g., fooling the referee, elbowing the 
opposition) on the soccer field.  Overall, these finding do provide some support that the 
MIS is capable of predicting behavioral intentions, actual behaviors, and moral 
cognitions. 
 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Moral Centrality Approach and the Moral 
Identity Scale 
 One of the major strengths of the moral centrality approach is how it revolves 
around Blasi’s (1980, 1993, 1995) pioneering work to discover the degree to which moral 
features become centralized within the self.  This unification of moral features leads to 
another strength: parsimony in measurement.  That is, measurement involves a 
quantitative approach whereupon participants are merely asked to quantify the degree to 
which moral characteristics are fundamental to self.  Furthermore, research under this 
approach involves all of humankind, not just exemplars or those nominated for their 
moral endeavors.  Measurement from this approach has also utilized methods derived 
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from the moral personality approach, which is yet another strength.  For example, in 
developing the MIS, Aquino and Reed (2002, studies 1 and 2) relied on the moral 
prototype method in generating the list of adjectives that participants are asked to 
consider.  Furthermore, the characteristics used are those that have been verified in moral 
exemplar research to be possessed by moral exemplars.  A final strength is that 
measurements—particularly the MIS—have been shown to shown to have documented 
relationships with moral functioning (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hall & Derryberry, 2010; 
Reed & Aquino, 2003; Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007).   
 Though strengths exist, some important weaknesses need to be considered.  The 
majority of the weaknesses have to do with the measurement that has been preeminently 
relied on under this approach, the MIS.  Because participants may feel pressure to 
respond in a certain way on the MIS, the role of social desirability is very plausible.  For 
example, it seems very difficult that participants would score too low on the MIS.  A 
good example of this comes from Aquino and Reed (study 5, 2002) in which they 
reported extremely high means and very low standard deviations of the average score for 
each question for both the internalization (M = 4.58, SD = 0.42) and symbolization (M = 
3.12, SD = 0.69) scales of the MIS using 5-point Likert scales.  In addition, in terms of 
the average total score for each scale, Hall and Derryberry (2010) also reported extremely 
high means and low standard deviations for the low racial prejudice group: internalization 
(M = 24.03, SD = 1.24) and symbolization (M = 18.48, SD = 3.42 ).  Based on the 
evidence, it seems that the internalization dimension of the scale is more susceptible to 
less variability and higher scoring.  Supporting this notion, Hall and Derryberry (2010) 
made their data available, and a skewness analysis indicated that the internalization 
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scores of the MIS were highly negatively skewed, which means that the majority of 
scores were high as opposed to low.  Hence, there is little variability in terms of the 
manner in which participants answer the questions, which certainly precipitates concerns 
about construct validity.   
 Further analysis of the Hall and Derryberry (2010) data also showed a significant 
positive correlation with the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding Scale 6, an 
index used to measure social desirability, and the MIS symbolization scale score (r = .24, 
p = .007).  As such, there is support that limited variability may be the result of social 
desirability.  Another potential weakness of the MIS is the inconsistency of the Likert 
scale.  Because some researchers prefer to use a 5-point scale as opposed to a 7-point 
scale, it is possible that limited variability may result from such inconsistent 
measurement.  One final weakness to note deals with types of behaviors that the MIS is 
purported to predict.  As opposed to complex moral behaviors (e.g., moral exemplar 
nominations for taking care of the poor) that have been analyzed by Monroe and 
Epperson (1994), Hart and Fegley (1995), Colby and Damon (1992), and Walker and 
Frimer (2007), the MIS (Aquino & Reed, studies 4, 5, and 6; Hall & Derryberry, 2010; 
Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007) to 
date has only been used to predict simple cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors. Thus, the 
MIS does have some significant weaknesses that need to be addressed given its 
prominence in contributing to the moral centrality approach.  
Statement of the Problem 
 The moral personality approach has enabled verification via the moral exemplar 
method that moral exemplars possess a distinct moral identity (Hart & Fegley, 1995; 
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Colby & Damon, 1992; Monroe & Epperson, 1994; Walker & Frimer, 2007).  In the 
same vein, the moral personality approach has enabled verification via the moral 
prototype method that the moral identity of moral exemplars is logically distinct from 
others (Walker & Pitts, 1998; Walker, 1999).  Although this is the case, such distinctions 
have not, to this point, been capitalized upon in measuring the moral self. 
With regard to the moral centrality approach, it has enabled a willingness to 
consider quantitative measurement of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and 
verification that such measurements can relate to moral functioning (Aquino & Reed, 
2002, studies 5 and 6; Hall & Derryberry, 2010; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Reed, Aquino, & 
Levy, 2007; Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006).  However, a variety of measurement 
limitations are associated with this approach such as social desirability and skewness.  It 
seems like these limitations could be addressed by further capitalizing on the 
understanding that the moral personality approach has generated.  In other words, it 
seems that moral identity could be more effectively measured if measurement of identity 
capitalized upon strengths associated with both the moral personality and moral centrality 
approaches. 
Purpose of the Study 
Thus, the purpose of the current study is to attempt to improve the Moral Identity 
Scale rather than replace it.  Because the MIS does, to an extent, seem to predict certain 
kinds of moral functioning (Aquino & Reed, 2002, studies 5 and 6; Hall & Derryberry, 
2010; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; Sage & Kavussanu, 2010), it 
would be detrimental to the study of moral psychology to abandon a measurement device 
that has accounted for moral functioning.  Additionally, it is quick to administer, which is 
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extremely attractive for researchers in the field, especially considering how the moral 
identity construct has been measured in the past (i.e., interview-based methods).  Thus, a 
revision of the scale seems prudent. 
The purpose of this study, then, is to determine whether a revised MIS (RMIS) 
can reduce skewness, decrease social desirability effects, and be a better predictor of 
moral functioning observed in everyday life.  The RMIS will capitalize on the moral 
personality approach by requiring the participants to read and compare themselves with 
moral exemplars.  First, the participants will read two short stories of actual moral 
exemplars (i.e., Tony and Virginia Foster Durr).  Second, the participants will write down 
the characteristics that they share and do not share with the exemplars about whom they 
read and then complete the initial procedures of the MIS: review the nine moral 
characteristics and visualization of how a person with these traits would feel, act, and 
think.  Third, information will be given regarding the rarity of the moral exemplars about 
whom they read.  This will include the costs and benefits of being a moral exemplar, in 
addition to information stating the moral exemplars would score extremely high on tests 
of morality.  Additionally, this information will stress that the average person does not 
fall into the exemplar category, which is perfectly normal.  Fourth, they will be asked to 
complete the ten questions according to their own perspective on 7-item Likert Scale.  
Finally, a five-item quiz (i.e., recognition memory test) will be given to determine 
whether the participants actually read the stories (More information about the RMIS is 
available in the Methods section and Appendix G). 
Because people do recognize that people who are moral exemplars typically 
possess personality traits that differ from the general population (Walker, 1999; Walker 
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& Pitts, 1998), when they read and compare themselves with the moral exemplars (Colby 
& Damon, 1992; Monroe & Epperson, 1994), the truth about their own morality may 
resonate with them because it would be difficult to compare themselves with people who 
are high in moral functioning.  As such, hopefully this will force the participants to 
answer the questions honestly according to their own moral functioning, which may 
reduce skewness and the negative impact of social desirability.  Additionally, the RMIS 
will utilize a 7-point Likert Scale (the MIS use a 5-point Likert Scale) to increase the 
variation in the scores, which may also reduce negative skewness.  Finally, to address the 
influence of social desirability on scoring, the Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (BIDR; Li & Bagger, 2007) will be utilized in this study.  In addition, post 
hoc skewness analyses will also be conducted.   
In addition, this study will attempt to determine whether the revised MIS is a 
better predictor of moral functioning than the original MIS.  First, because those people 
who are considered moral exemplars consider all humans to be equally important (Colby 
& Damon, 1992; Monroe & Epperson, 1994), the Identification with all of Humanity 
Scale (IWAHS; McMarland & Brown, 2008) will be utilized.  Second, because moral 
exemplars are typically viewed as empathic people (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Walker, 
1999; Walker & Pitts, 1998), The Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (DIRI; Davis, 
1980) will also be utilized to measure this construct.  Third, because the moral self-
concept has been associated with conscientiousness (Walker, 1999), the Ten-Item 
Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) will be used to 
specifically assess this construct.  Finally, in order to index actual moral behavior, an 
honesty indicator procedure taken from Derryberry and Thoma (2005) will be utilized.  
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Because the moral prototype method and the moral exemplar method have demonstrated 
that honesty is related to morality and because the index of honesty that will be used is 
regarded as a complex instance of moral behavior (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005), using a 
procedure that measures honesty will be beneficial to this proposed study. 
Hypotheses   
Overall, the hypothesis of this study is that the revised Moral Identity Scale—
compared to the original Moral Identity Scale—will have a reduction in skewness, a 
reduction in social desirability effects, and an increase in the ability to predict moral 
functioning.  The specific hypotheses of this study are, as follows: 
(1) Those completing the RMIS will score lower than control participants who 
complete the original MIS. 
(2) The RMIS will be less susceptible to social desirability than the original MIS. 
(3) Because more complex instances of moral functioning will be used in the 
current study, the RMIS will account for significant variance in these 
constructs while the original MIS will not.   
Method 
Participants 
 Participants included 150 college students from a large Southeastern university.  
These participants included 81 freshmen, 42 sophomores, 12 juniors, 14 seniors, and 1 
individual who indicated other.  Ages ranged from 18 to 45 with a mean of 19.59.  The 
sample included 47 males and 103 females.  For those participants who indicated their 
ethnicity, 21 were African American, 5 were Hispanic or Latino, 117 were White, 2 were 
Asian American, and 5 indicated other.   
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Materials 
 Demographic Questionnaire.  A demographics questionnaire regarding the 
background of the participants was used in this study.  The questionnaire included age, 
gender, college classification, major, ethnic origin.   
Social Desirability.  In order to address the effect of social desirability on 
scoring, the Impression Management factor of Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (BIDR; Li & Bagger, 2007) scale was utilized.  The Impression Management 
(IM) factor is comprised of 20 questions on a 7-point Likert scale, “with 1 denoting not 
true and 7 denoting very true” (Li & Bagger, 2007, p. 527). An example of questions 
from the IM factor are, ‘‘When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening’’ (Li & 
Bagger, 2007, p. 527).  In terms of internal consistency, Li and Bagger reported an 
overall Cronbach’s alpha of α = .80.  In this study, the Cronbach’s alpha of Impression 
Management was α = .76 
Moral Identity Scale.  In order to evaluate the extent to which a person values 
moral characteristics, the Moral Identity Scale (MIS; Aquino & Reed, 2002) was also 
utilized in this study.  The MIS is comprised of two factors relating to moral identity, 
with 5 questions corresponding to each: The internalization scale addresses the extent to 
which one values moral traits, and the symbolization scale seeks to identify whether 
one’s actions demonstrate a commitment to moral self-expression or commitment (e.g., 
group membership, activities considered moral).  First, participants are asked to review 
nine characteristics that may exemplify one who has a propensity for moral action.  
Second, a visualization task is done in which participants are asked to imagine how a 
person with these traits would feel, act, and think.  Finally, participants will answer each 
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of the 10 questions on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 
meaning strongly agree.  Examples of questions from the internalization and 
symbolization scale are, as follows: ‘‘It would make me feel good to be a person who has 
these characteristics’’ and ‘‘I am actively involved in activities that communicate to 
others that I have these characteristics’’ (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1428).  Overall, both 
the internalization (Cronbach’s α = .83) and symbolization (Cronbach’s α = .82) scales of 
the MIS have high internal consistency reliability coefficients (Aquino & Reed, study 2, 
2002).  In terms of this study, Cronbach’s alpha of internalization was α = .36, and 
Cronbach’s alpha of the symbolization scale was α = .81. 
 Empathy.  The Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (DIRI; Davis, 1980) is an 
index of dispositional empathy, which breaks down the construct of empathy into four 
separate but related factors.  Although the index is comprised of 28 questions with four 
dimensions of 7 questions each, this study utilized only two dimensions: Perspective 
taking (PT) and empathic concern (EC).  According to Davis (1980), the perspective 
taking (PT) dimension evaluates the extent to which one takes the perspective of other 
people.  The empathic concern (EC) dimension evaluates whether one has genuine 
concern for people in distress.  Each question is answered on a 5-point likert scale (A-E), 
with A being “Does not describe me well” and E being “Describes me very well”.  
Examples of questions from the perspective taking and empathic concern dimensions are, 
as follows: ‘‘Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in 
their place’’ and ‘‘When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
toward them’’ (Davis, 1980, p. 11).  With regard to the internal consistency reliability of 
the entire scale, Hall and Derryberry (2010) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .82.  In 
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this study, the Cronbach’s alpha of Perspective taking was α = .62, and the internal 
consistency reliability of empathic concern was α = .74 
Humanity Identification.  In order to evaluate the extent to which a person 
identifies with other groups of people, the Identification with all of Humanity Scale 
(IWAHS; McFarland & Brown, 2008) was utilized.  The IWAHS is comprised of 9 
questions with three different levels.  For instance, an example of a question with three 
different levels is, as follows: How close do you feel to each of the following groups? a. 
People in my community, b. Americans, c. People all over the world?  Each level is 
answered on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 being “not at all close” and 5 being 
“very close” (McFarland & Brown, 2008).  According to McFarland and Brown, the 
average coefficient for internal consistency of this scale across samples was α = .85.  
With regard to this study, the coefficient for internal consistency reliability was α = .90. 
Conscientiousness.  In order to measure the degree to which one considers him or 
herself to be conscientious, the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, 
& Swann, 2003) was used.  The TIPI consists of 10 question designed to measure the 
BIG-Five personality traits.  In terms of measuring conscientiousness, question 3 and 
question 8 were only analyzed.  For instance, question 3 requires the participants to rate 
on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = disagree strongly; 7 = agree strongly) the degree to 
which they see themselves as dependable and self-disciplined.  In terms of the internal 
consistency reliability of conscientiousness, α = .17 in the control condition and α = .47 
in the experimental condition were found in this study.   
Revised Moral Identity Scale.  Just like the original MIS, the revised MIS is 
comprised of two factors relating to moral identity, with the same 5 questions 
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corresponding to each: The internalization scale addresses the extent to which one values 
moral traits, and the symbolization scale seeks to identify whether one’s actions 
demonstrate a commitment to moral self-expression or commitment (e.g., group 
membership, activities considered moral).  First, the RMIS requires the participants to 
read one story of an individual who assisted the Jews during World War II (Tony) 
(Monroe & Epperson, 1994) and one story of an individual who displayed moral 
exemplarity such as helping minorities and the less fortunate (Virginia Foster Durr) 
(Colby & Damon, 1992), respectively.  Second, the participants write down the 
characteristics that they share and do not share with the exemplars about whom they read 
and then complete the initial procedures of the MIS: review the nine moral characteristics 
and visualization of how a person with these traits would feel, act, and think.  Third, 
information is given regarding the rarity of the moral exemplars about whom they have 
read.  For example, this includes the costs and benefits of being a moral exemplar, in 
addition to information stating that the moral exemplars would score extremely high on 
tests of morality.  Additionally, this information stresses that the average person does not 
fall into the exemplar category, which is perfectly normal.  Fourth, they are asked to 
complete the ten questions according to their own perspective.  Finally, a five-item quiz 
(i.e., recognition memory test) is given to determine whether the participants actually 
read the stories (More information about the RMIS is available in the Methods section; 
see Appendix G for a copy of the RMIS).  In terms of this study, Cronbach’s alpha of 
internalization was α =.81, and Cronbach’s alpha of the symbolization scale was α = .83. 
Index of Behavior.  In order to determine whether the original MIS or Revised 
MIS is a better predictor of moral behavior, an actual index of behavior was adopted from 
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the Derryberry and Thoma study (2005) in which participants were given a chance to 
demonstrate an act of honesty.  The modified instructions from Derryberry and Thoma 
are presented, as follows: Prior to participation in the study and upon two subsequent 
times during the study, participants are informed that their involvement will be rewarded 
with five raffle tickets for a drawing for one of three cash prizes. Upon completing their 
involvement in the study, participants have the opportunity to claim remuneration from a 
research assistant.  Once the research assistant verifies the participants’ involvement, the 
research assistant states, "You are to receive 10 raffle tickets for your participation. Is 
that correct?" Participants who correct the mistake are presumed to have behaved 
honestly. Participants who keep the extra tickets are suspected of dishonesty. Participants 
who indicate uncertainty about how much was to be received are given 10 tickets. Those 
participants who receive the double remuneration are called 2 weeks later. They are told 
that an error had been made and that the purpose of the phone call was to find out who 
had been given tickets and how many they had received. Five different types of responses 
are recorded, which range from acknowledgment that 10 tickets were received to no 
recollection of the amount of remuneration received to acknowledgment that 5 tickets 
were received. Participants' responses are repeated to them for confirmation. A 4-point 
scoring system will be used: Those who do not claim their remuneration are assigned a 
score of 0, which indicates that no action was taken.  Those who correct the research 
assistant are given a score of 1. Those who took the wrong amount but admit the actual 
amount of remuneration they received over the phone are given a score of 2. Those who 
took the wrong amount but fail to remember the amount or report a different amount on 
the phone are given a score of 3.  
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Survey Software.  The demographic questionnaire, BIDR, MIS, Revised MIS, 
DIRI, and IWAH were installed on a Dell computer that is equipped with survey 
software.  
Procedure           
 Participants were randomly assigned to either the control condition (original 
MIS) or the experimental condition (Revised MIS).  In the control condition, they were 
asked to read and sign the informed consent document.  After the document was read and 
signed, they completed—in order—the demographic questionnaire, BIDR, DIRI, IWAH, 
TIPI, and MIS.  In the experimental condition, participants were also asked to read and 
sign the informed consent document before the study took place.  At this point, 
participants then completed the demographic questionnaire, BIDR, DIRI, IWAH, TIPI, 
and Revised MIS.  In addition, the participants were timed while they completed the 
RMIS.  After each of the groups completed the study, the procedure from Derryberry and 
Thoma (2005) was utilized for the purpose of assessing honesty.  Data collection was 
conducted at the Research of Ethical and Social Topics Lab and took no longer than 30-
45 minutes for each experimental condition. 
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Results 
 Descriptive statistics for participants on all variables of interest can be found in 
Table 1.  With the exception of the differing forms of the Moral Identity Scale, both 
groups scored similarly on all considered variables.   
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for conditions 
 Total Control       Experimental 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Internalization 30.97 4.24    31.96** 3.09    30.04** 4.94 
Symbolization 21.51 6.57 22.49 6.24 20.58 6.78 
Honesty 1.01 1.08 1.01 1.11 1.00 1.06 
Conscientiousness 8.43 1.60 8.33 1.73 8.53 1.47 
Id. w/ All Humanity -.004 .99 .013       .95 -.021 1.05 
Perspective Taking 24.44 4.79 25.04 4.61 23.86 4.93 
Empathic Concern 28.07 4.53 28.70 4.33 27.47 4.66 
Impression Management    5.72 3.12 5.64 3.09 5.81 3.17 
 Note: * * = significant difference between conditions; Internalization = Moral Identity 
Scale/Internalization Subscale, Symbolization = Moral Identity Scale/Symbolization Subscale, Honesty = 
Observed act of honesty, Conscientiousness = Ten Item Personality Inventory, Id. w/ All Humanity = 
Identification With All of Humanity Scale Residual Score, Perspective Taking = Davis Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index/Perspective Taking Subscale, Empathic Concern = Davis Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index/Empathic Concern Subscale, Impression Management = Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding/Impression Management Subscale.  
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To address hypothesis 1 (i.e., Those completing the RMIS will score lower than 
control participants who complete the original MIS.), a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) was conducted.  This analysis was used to determine whether there was 
significant variation across Moral Identity Scale Internalization scores (i.e., MISINT) and 
Moral Identity Scale Symbolization scores (i.e., MISSYM) between the experimental and 
control conditions.  This analysis can also address whether there are significant 
differences between the conditions for either scale.  Multivariate tests reported a 
significant difference across MISINT and MISSYM scores between conditions (F [2, 
147] = 4.048 , p = .019, η2 = .05).  Univariate statistics revealed that the control group 
scored significantly higher than the experimental group on MISINT (F [1, 148] = 7.162, 
p = .008, η2 = .05).  Additionally, the control group scored higher than the experimental 
group on MISSYM, though the difference was not statistically significant (F [1, 148] = 
2.321, p = .13, η2 = .02).   
To address hypothesis 2 (The RMIS will be less susceptible to social desirability 
than the original MIS.), bivariate correlations were computed in each condition between 
both MIS scale indices and the Impression Management Scale of the Balanced Inventory 
of Desirable Responding (BIDRim).  In the control condition, significant correlations 
were observed between BIDRim and MISINT (r = .283, p = .018) and MISSYM (r 
= .309, p = .009).  In the experimental condition, significant correlations were only 
observed between BIDRim and MISINT (r = .254, p = .027).  Skewness of MISINT and 
MISSYM scores were also observed in considering hypothesis 2.  Overall, skewness is 
similar in both conditions for MISINT (control = -.999, experimental = -1.182) and 
MISSYM (control = -.256, experimental = -.194).   
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Given the relationships observed with BIDRim above, hypothesis 1 analyses were 
reconsidered.  Specifically, a Multivariate Analysis of Covariance was conducted with 
BIDRim employed as the covariate in order to control for social desirability.    Results 
indicate that BIDRim was a significant covariate (F [2, 142] = 5.645, p = .004, η2 = .07).  
Differences observed at the multivariate level remained consistent with an increase in 
effect size (F [2, 142] = 5.027, p = .008, η2 = .07).  BIDRim was a significant covariate at 
the univariate level for MISINT (F [1, 143] = 10.279, p = .002, η2 = .07) but not 
MISSYM.  Differences observed between groups on MISINT remained consistent with 
an increase in effect size (F [1, 143] = 8.487, p = .004, η2 = .06).   
To address hypothesis 3 (Because more complex instances of moral functioning 
will be used in the current study, the RMIS will account for significant variance in these 
constructs while the original MIS will not), two different types of analyses were 
considered.     Correlational analyses were first used to determine the extent to which 
MIS scores related to honesty, conscientiousness, identification with all of humanity, 
perspective taking, and empathic concern (See Table 2) in each condition.  In instances 
where significant correlations with MISINT or MISSYM existed in either condition, 
linear regression was considered.  Such instances (see Table 2) occurred for 
Conscientiousness, Identification with All of Humanity, Perspective Taking, and 
Empathic Concern.  Thus, four separate regression analyses were conducted for each 
condition with each of these variables employed as the dependent variable.  Each analysis 
consisted of three blocks: the first block included MISINT scores; the second block 
included MISSYM scores; and the third block included BIDR impression management 
(BIDRim) scores given the reported correlations between the Moral Identity Scale scores 
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and BIDRim in consideration of hypothesis 2.  The regression analyses were conducted 
hierarchically so that the contribution to variance of each independent variable could be 
observed.        
Table 2 
 
Correlation Matrix for Control and Experimental Conditions 
 
Control INT SYM HON CON IWAH PT EC 
INT 1.00       
SYM .348** 1.00      
HON -.016 .022 1.00     
CON .125 .251* .139 1.00    
IWAH .121 .239* .027 -.041 1.00   
PT .183 .109 .137 .112 .233 1.00  
EC .356** .264* .010 .152 .270* .218 1.00 
Experimental INT SYM HON CON IWAH PT EC 
INT 1.00       
SYM .133 1.00      
HON .079 .018 1.00     
CON .390** .225* .095 1.00    
IWAH -.091 -.004 -.031 -.216 1.00   
PT .294** -.075 -.018 .093 -.042 1.00  
EC .342** .133 .028 .176 -.104 .393** 1.00 
 
Note: ** p < .01   * p < .05; HON = Observed Act of Honesty, CON = Ten Item Personality Inventory, 
IWAH = Identification with All of Humanity Scale Residual Score, PT = Davis Interpersonal Reactivity 
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Index/Perspective Taking Subscale, EC = Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index/Empathic Concern 
Subscale, INT = Moral Identity Scale/Internalization Subscale, SYM = Moral Identity Scale/Symbolization 
Subscale.  
For TIPI Conscientiousness scores, no significant contributions to variance were 
seen for the three blocks in the control condition (See Table 3).  Additionally, none of the 
employed independent variables was a significant predictor of TIPI Conscientiousness 
scores (See Table 3).  In the experimental condition, significant contributions to variance 
were seen for the first and third blocks.  Furthermore, MIS internalization was a positive 
and significant predictor across the three blocks, and BIDR impression management was 
a positive predictor in the third block (See Table 3).   
For IWAH scores, no significant contributions to variance were seen in any of the 
three blocks in the control condition (see Table 4).  Additionally, not one of the employed 
independent variables was a significant predictor of IWAH scores in the control condition 
(see Table 4).  In the experimental condition, no significant contributions were seen in 
any of the three blocks.  Additionally, none of the employed independent variables was a 
significant predictor.   
For Perspective Taking, no significant contributions to variance were seen in the 
first two blocks for the control condition, though a significant contribution was seen in 
the third block (See Table 5).  Additionally, BIDR impression management was a 
positive predictor of Perspective Taking in the control condition.  In the experimental 
condition, a significant contribution to variance was seen in the first block blocks (See 
Table 5).  MIS internalization was a significant and positive predictor of Perspective 
Taking in all three blocks (See Table 5). 
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For Empathic Concern, significant contributions to variance were seen in in the 
first block for the control condition (see Table 7).  MIS internalization was a significant 
and positive predictor in each of the three blocks.  In the experimental condition, a 
significant contribution to variance was seen in the first block (see Table 7).  MIS 
internalization was a positive predictor of Empathic Concern in each of the three blocks 
in the experimental condition. 
Table 3  
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for TIPI Conscientiousness 
Control  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .012, p = .371) 
MISINT 
 
.065 .072 .109 .901 .371 
Block 2  
(R2 = .206, p = .148) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
.029 
.055 
.075 
.037 
.048 
.185 
.381 
1.462 
.704 
.148 
Block 3  
(R2 = .242, p = .293)  
MISINT 
MISSYM 
BIDRim 
 
.012 
.045 
.081 
 
.077 
.038 
.076 
 
.021 
.152 
.136 
 
.159 
1.169 
1.059 
 
.874 
.247 
.293 
Experimental  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .148, p = .001) 
MISINT 
 
.166 .046 .385 3.592 .001 
Block 2  
(R2 = .180, p = .099) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
.156 
.056 
.046 
.033 
.362 
.179 
3.388 
1.671 
.001 
.099 
Block 3  MISINT .131 .047 .303 2.800 .007 
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(R2 = .228, p = .037)  MISSYM 
BIDRim 
.059 
.153 
.033 
.072 
.190 
.228 
1.820 
2.128 
.073 
.037 
 
Note: MISINT = Moral Identity Scale/Internalization Subscale, MISSYM = Moral Identity 
Scale/Symbolization Subscale, BIDRim = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding/Impression 
Management Subscale. 
Table 4 
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for IWAH Scores 
Control  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .013, p = .347) 
MISINT 
 
.035 .037 .114 .948 .347 
Block 2  
(R2 = .056, p = .087) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
.013 
.033 
.038 
.019 
.043 
.218 
.341 
1.739 
.734 
.087 
Block 3  
(R2 = .066, p = .393)  
MISINT 
MISSYM 
BIDRim 
.006 
.029 
.034 
.039 
.020 
.039 
.020 
.192 
.110 
.159 
1.481 
.861 
.874 
.143 
.393 
Experimental   B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .011, p = .368) 
MISINT 
 
-.023 .025 -.106 -.905 .368 
Block 2  
(R2 = .011, p = .984) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
-.023 
.000 
.025 
.018 
-.106 
.002 
-.896 
.021 
.374 
.984 
Block 3  
(R2 = .016, p = .578)  
MISINT 
MISSYM 
BIDRim 
-.019 
.000 
-.023 
.026 
.019 
.041 
-.089 
-.003 
-.069 
-.725 
-.021 
-.560 
.471 
.983 
.578 
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Note: MISINT = Moral Identity Scale/Internalization Subscale, MISSYM = Moral Identity 
Scale/Symbolization Subscale, BIDRim = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding/Impression 
Management Subscale. 
Table 5 
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Perspective Taking 
Control  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .033, p = .134) 
MISINT 
 
.270 .178 .181 2.882 .134 
Block 2  
(R2 = .037, p = .585) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
.237 
.050 
.189 
.094 
.159 
.068 
1.253 
.534 
.215 
.595 
Block 3  
(R2 = .167, p = .002)  
MISINT 
MISSYM 
BIDRim 
.119 
-.019 
.577 
.181 
.090 
.180 
.080 
-.026 
.387 
.658 
-.212 
3.210 
.513 
.833 
.002 
Experimental  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .091, p = .008) 
MISINT 
 
.301 .111 .301 2.720 .008 
Block 2  
(R2 = .104, p = .303) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
.316 
-.084 
.112 
.081 
.316 
-.116 
2.833 
-1.037 
.006 
.303 
Block 3  
(R2 = .133, p = .126)  
MISINT 
MISSYM 
BIDRim 
.270 
-.077 
.273 
.114 
.080 
.176 
.271 
-.107 
.176 
2.362 
-.964 
1.546 
.021 
.338 
.126 
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Note: MISINT = Moral Identity Scale/Internalization Subscale, MISSYM = Moral Identity 
Scale/Symbolization Subscale, BIDRim = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding/Impression 
Management Subscale. 
Table 6 
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Empathic Concern  
Control  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .116, p = .004) 
MISINT 
 
.477 .159 .341 2.993 .004 
Block 2  
(R2 = .136, p = .226) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
.410 
.102 
.168 
.083 
.293 
.147 
2.440 
1.223 
.017 
.226 
Block 3  
(R2 = .139, p = .605)  
MISINT 
MISSYM 
BIDRim 
.392 
.091 
.089 
.172 
.086 
.171 
.280 
.132 
.064 
2.271 
1.057 
 .520 
.026 
.294 
.605 
Experimental  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .116, p = .003) 
MISINT 
 
.324 .104 .341 3.116 .003 
Block 2  
(R2 = .124, p = .426) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
.313 
.061 
.105 
.076 
.329 
.088 
2.979 
.801 
.004 
.426 
Block 3  
(R2 = .126, p = .646)  
MISINT 
MISSYM
BIDRim 
.300 
.063 
.078 
.109 
.076 
.169 
.315 
.091 
.053 
2.742 
.820 
.461 
.008 
.415 
.646 
 
Note: MISINT = Moral Identity Scale/Internalization Subscale, MISSYM = Moral Identity 
Scale/Symbolization Subscale, BIDRim = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding/Impression 
Management Subscale. 
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 A fifth linear regression analysis was conducted in which an omnibus variable of 
sociomoral functioning was created.  This variable accounts for high performance relative 
to the sample in each of the five indices of sociomoral functioning: honesty, 
conscientiousness, identification with all of humanity, perspective taking, and empathic 
concern.  For each of the five variables, z scores were created.  The created z scores were 
then converted to t scores in order to eliminate negative scores.  The t scores of the five 
variables were then multiplied by one another.  No significant differences were observed 
between conditions on this variable.    
For the omnibus variable, a significant contribution to variance was seen in the 
third block in the control condition.  Additionally, BIDR impression management was a 
positive predictor of the omnibus variable in the control condition.  In the experimental 
condition, a significant contribution to variance was seen in the first block.  Furthermore, 
MIS internalization was a positive predictor of the omnibus variable in each of the three 
blocks for the experimental condition.  
Table 7 
Summary of Linear Regression Analyses for Omnibus Variable  
Control  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .052, p = .057) 
MISINT 
 
12965678.04 6689740.334 .229 1.938 .057 
Block 2  
(R2 = .095, p = .081) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
8931932.274 
6121813.298 
6969120.899 
3454632.592 
.158 
.218 
1.282 
1.772 
.204 
.081 
Block 3  
(R2 = .167, p = .025)  
MISINT 
MISSYM 
5605598.728 
4166199.547 
6880185.987 
3438921.262 
.099 
.148 
.815 
1.211 
.418 
.230 
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BIDRim 16315669.43 6840593.624 .288 2.385 .020 
Experimental  B SE B Β T Sig. 
Block 1  
(R2 = .203, p = .000) 
MISINT 
 
14608889.08 3411390.590 .451 4.282 .000 
Block 2  
(R2 = .209, p = .482) 
MISINT 
MISSYM 
14341427.36 
1773606.287 
3444130.819 
2508247.357 
.442 
.075 
4.164 
.707 
.000 
.482 
Block 3  
(R2 = .217, p = .380)  
MISINT 
MISSYM
BIDRim 
13562504.86 
1939113.233 
4884808.718 
3560141.634 
251.9073.429 
5524429.086 
.418 
.082 
.097 
3.810 
.770 
.884 
.000 
.444 
.380 
 
Note: MISINT = Moral Identity Scale/Internalization Subscale, MISSYM = Moral Identity 
Scale/Symbolization Subscale, BIDRim = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding/Impression 
Management Subscale. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this research study was to attempt to improve the quantitative 
measurement of the moral identity construct.  Given the promise yet noted flaws of the 
Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002), it seemed beneficial to the study of moral 
psychology and ethics to attempt to improve the precision of this scale.  The Moral 
Identity Scale is quick to administer, which is tremendously attractive for scientists and 
moral psychologists in this arena, especially considering how the moral sense of self has 
been measured in the past (i.e., interview-based methods).  As such, an attempt to revise 
or tweak the scale – rather than create a new one – in a manner that incorporates other 
traditions and approaches to the measurement of the moral self seemed sensible.  The 
current study proposed various assertions pertaining to the Revised Moral Identity Scale 
(i.e., RMIS) and the Moral Identity Scale (i.e., MIS): the Revised Moral Identity Scale—
compared to the original Moral Identity Scale—would have a reduction in skewness, a 
reduction in social desirability effects, and the capacity to account for more complex 
instances of moral functioning.   
Three hypotheses were proposed in the current study.  First, it was hypothesized 
that those participants who completed the RMIS (i.e., experimental group) would score 
lower than control participants who completed the original MIS.  This hypothesis was 
supported as a significant difference was observed in terms of the control group scoring 
higher than the experimental group on Moral Identity Scale Internalization scores 
(MISINT).  In addition, although the difference between the groups was not statistically 
significant, the control group scored higher than the experimental group on Moral 
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Identity Scale Symbolization scores (MISSYM). Differences observed for both indices 
remained even after controlling for social desirability.    
Second, it was hypothesized that the RMIS would be less susceptible to social 
desirability than the original MIS.  This hypothesis was not supported.  In the control 
condition, significant correlations were observed between impression management and 
MISINT and MISSYM.  In the experimental condition, significant correlations were only 
observed between impression management and MISINT. Additionally, negative 
skewness was seen in the control and experimental conditions for MISINT and 
MISSYM.   
Third, it was hypothesized that, because more complex instances of moral 
functioning would be used in the current study, the RMIS would account for significant 
variance in these constructs while the original MIS would not.  This hypothesis was 
supported for the most part.  In the experimental condition, positive and significant 
correlations were observed among scores on the MISINT scale and conscientiousness, 
perspective taking, empathic concern, and created omnibus variable accounting for 
sociomoral functioning overall.  Furthermore, the significant contribution to 
conscientiousness variance, perspective taking variance, empathic concern variance, and 
omnibus variable score variance from the MISINT scale of the experimental condition in 
the conducted regression analysis also supports the hypothesis. As such, a significant 
amount of variance in the dependent variables was accounted for by the MISINT.  In the 
control condition, a positive correlation was seen between MISINT and empathic 
concern.  In addition, positive correlations were observed among MISSYM scores and 
conscientiousness, identification with all of humanity, and empathic concern.  MISINT 
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was a significant predictor in each block of empathic concern for the control condition.  
Although positive correlations were observed among MISSYM, conscientiousness, 
identification with all of humanity, and empathic concern, MISSYM failed to account for 
significant contributions to variance in any of the dependent variables.  Though this may 
have been a surprise, MISSYM failed to account for significant differences in the 
dependent variables.  To further support hypothesis three, a significant contribution to 
variance of perspective taking and the omnibus variable score was seen in block three of 
the control condition where impression management was an extremely significant 
predictor and accounted for a large majority of the variance.  As such, social desirability 
seems to significantly influence the degree to which MISSYM predicts moral outcomes.  
These findings also support the notion that the RMIS accounts for significant variance in 
the abovementioned moral constructs while the original MIS does not.  Additionally, 
these findings give some credence to hypothesis 2 regarding the original MIS being more 
susceptible to social desirability. 
Overall, this study provides some insight into the complexities that exist when 
trying to quantitatively measure the moral identity construct.  First, as stated above, both 
the MIS and RMIS are susceptible to social desirability, and both are negatively skewed.  
However, the RMIS produces lower scores and is better at predicting the indices of 
sociomoral functioning used here.  These findings present quite the conundrum.  How 
does it happen that both measurements are susceptible to social desirability and both are 
skewed, yet one performs better in terms of scores and prediction?  One possible 
explanation is that, although MISINT was significantly correlated with impression 
management in the experimental condition, both MISINT and MISSYM were 
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significantly correlated with impression management in the control condition.  In 
addition, MISINT in the experimental condition had a lower correlation with impression 
management than MISINT and impression management in the control condition.  As 
such, it may be that the RMIS is less susceptible to the influence of social desirability 
than is the MIS, yet still the RMIS is susceptible.  
Another possible explanation the social desirability bias is that perhaps most 
measures associated with measuring a hypothetical construct related to morality are 
susceptible to social desirability.  In other words, people do not want to be viewed 
negatively by others as research has illustrated (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987).  Thus, 
although the RMIS was positively and significantly correlated with social desirability 
(i.e., impression management), the influence of impression management is not as 
harmful.  Ultimately, the story about which the participants read on the RMIS forces 
them to consider their actual moral values.  The original MIS, however, does not.  
Ultimately, the RMIS has lower scores, accounts for significant variation in moral 
constructs, and is less susceptible to social desirability.  It is an improvement, needless to 
say. Future research will have to continue to examine other ways to reduce the biased 
views that participants have about their morality relative to the exemplars.  
A second finding from this study that needs to be addressed is the nature of 
MISSYM construct.  According to a study conducted by Aquino and Reed (2002), the 
internalization (M = 4.05, SD = 0.67, r = .25, p < .01) scale was significantly correlated 
with actual donation behavior and the number of cans donated (M = 4.05, SD = 0.67, r = 
.28, p < .01) in a study that utilized actual behavioral outcomes.  In addition, Sage, 
Kavussanu, and Duda (2006) conducted a study in which they examined the extent to 
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which one’s moral sense of self might predict prosocial behaviors in a soccer game.  The 
authors discovered that the players who scored higher on the internalization measure 
were more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors and less likely to engage in antisocial 
behaviors.  Given these findings and the findings of this study, it seems like the 
internalization scale is more effective in predicting socio-moral outcomes.  Regardless of 
the utility of the symbolization index, the revisions made to the MIS may totally change 
its structure.  There is a significant correlation between symbolization and internalization 
in the control condition, and this relationship is nonexistent in the experimental condition.  
In other words, measurement of the symbolization construct on the RMIS may not be an 
accurate measurement of moral centrality.  Additionally, it is possible that symbolization 
measures that which is concerned with social perception and moral behavior due to its 
association with social desirability.  Ultimately, it may be that the revisions of the MIS 
result in only one useful construct associated with the extent to which a person considers 
morality central to his or her self-concept.   
A third finding from this study is that the RMIS is more useful than the MIS.  
However, though the internalization index of the experimental condition was more 
effective than the internalization index of the control condition in terms of predicting 
constructs of relevance, it is important to note that neither of the indices from either 
group actually predicted the behavioral outcome of honesty.  As a result, it is difficult to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the internalization index of the experimental condition in 
predicting actual behavior.  Ultimately, there were some problems with the honesty 
index, which may have made it extremely difficult to accurately measure that specific 
construct.  First, the small number of students who picked up the remuneration in this 
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study made it difficult to measure honesty.  Second, one of the problems with a 
measurement like the one used in this study (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005) is it is difficult 
to say whether the students who were considered deceitful were actually being deceitful 
intentionally since the remuneration being claimed was rather miniscule and not very 
substantial (i.e., raffle tickets vs. a significant amount of money).  In other words, 
because college students’ lives are replete with homework and social distractions, it is 
possible that they actually forget or simply did not pay attention to how many tickets that 
they were to be given.  As such, it is recommended that future studies using the RMIS 
use other measures of actual behavior.   
The last finding from this study is how the RMIS is more stable than the MIS in 
terms of internal consistency reliability.  In regard to the MIS scale, the Cronbach’s alpha 
of internalization is α =.36 for the control condition and α =.81 for the experimental 
condition.  As such, this means the index is much more stable for the experimental 
condition.  Although this finding is promising and substantiates contentions made about 
the original MIS, these findings concerning low alphas for the MIS, unfortunately, have 
not been seen in prior research that utilized this scale of moral centrality.  As a result, it is 
hard to determine whether the low alphas are due to conditions associated with the 
sample or due to the index itself.  Ultimately, it is a much more consistent index in the 
experimental condition, which is promising. 
Future directions 
 Although the RMIS is less susceptible to social desirability than the original MIS, 
both conditions had a similar negative skew that has been seen in prior research.  As 
mentioned above, Aquino and Reed (study 5, 2002) reported extremely high means and 
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very low standard deviations of the average score for each question for both the 
internalization (M = 4.58, SD = 0.42) and symbolization (M = 3.12, SD = 0.69) scales of 
the MIS.  In addition, Hall and Derryberry (2010) also reported extremely high means 
and low standard deviations for a low racial prejudice group: internalization (M = 24.03, 
SD = 1.24) and symbolization (M = 18.48, SD = 3.42).  The revisions to the MIS did not 
appear to alleviate skew and the scales’ relationship with a social desirability index.  
However, controlling for social desirability did not impact the differences in scores 
between groups nor did doing so prevent the Internalization index of the RMIS from 
predicting relevant constructs of sociomoral functioning (as was often the case for the 
Internalization index of the MIS).  Ultimately, future research needs to further evaluate 
the findings concerning social desirability and skew from this current study and test 
whether there are additional ways to limit these trends.    
 One final note of interest is regarding the predictive capabilities of the 
symbolization index.  As stated above, the original symbolization index in combination 
with the internalization index only accounted for only one additional positive correlation 
that was not found by the revised internalization index by itself.  As such, future research 
needs to explore whether the symbolization offers further utility in predicting sociomoral 
outcomes beyond the internalization index itself.  One way to address this, perhaps, is to 
change the order in which the Questionnaires are given.  In other words, because this 
current study presented the dependent indices before the presentation of the experimental 
manipulation (i.e., MIS and RMIS), presenting the manipulation first may force the 
participants to answer honestly on the additional indices of interest.  However, of course, 
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this may prime the participants to answer low on the other questionnaires, which may 
give rise to a high positive skew. 
Limitations    
The current study has limitations beyond those already noted.  First, the sample 
used in this study included a plethora of female students and underclassmen.  As a result, 
generalizability of the results may be a concern.  Second, a sample solely made up of 
participants from Kentucky, such as the one used in the current study, may be more rural, 
of lower socioeconomic status, and be overly representative of first-time college students 
than the general population.  Third, another limitation of this study was the failure to 
counterbalance the dependent measures of interest.  Finally, the Cronbach’s alphas for 
conscientiousness are low in this current study.  This is not surprising given the fact that 
it is only two items.  As such, future studies need to utilize more precise indices of 
conscientiousness.  
Conclusion 
 This study provides support that the efforts placed here to improve the Moral 
Identity Scale as a quantitative measurement of moral identity were worthwhile.  
Furthermore, because the symbolization scale of the original MIS only accounted for one 
additional positive correlation (i.e., IWAH) that was not accounted for by the 
internalization scale of the RMIS, it may be prudent to adopt a new measure of moral 
centrality that only uses the internalization scale.  This, naturally, may be pleasing to 
scientists in the moral domain because it would be even quicker to administer than the ten 
question measure that is currently utilized.  At the same time, doing so may limit the 
measurement of that which is comprised by one’s moral identity and therefore only 
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measure a part of moral identity.  In closing, although this study lends some support to 
the abovementioned hypotheses stated earlier, one should realize that this is one study 
and one sample from a specific part of the United States.  As such, it may not generalize 
to the general population, and the results found in this study regarding the improved 
precision of measurement that the RMIS offers may be tentative at this point. Ultimately, 
researchers around the country and the world should continue to improve the quantitative 
measurement of the moral sense of self in order to further the progress of research in this 
moral domain.  Though this study was a small step in that direction, it was a necessary 
and fruitful one.   
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Appendix A 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
DIRECTIONS: Please respond to the following questions by circling the number beside 
the most appropriate response, checking the appropriate selection, or filling in the blank. 
 
a.  Are you:  1. male 2. female 
 
b.  How old were you on your last birthday:  _____ 
 
c.  What is your college classification?  1. Freshman     2.  Sophomore     3.  Junior 
         4. Senior     5. Other (please name) ___________ 
 
d.  What is your major?  _______________   
 
 
e.  What is your ethnic origin (i.e., Caucasian, Native American, African American, 
Asian American, Latino, etc.)?  _______________   
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Appendix B 
 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how 
much you agree with it. 
1 ----------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5 ----------- 6 -----------7 
Not True Somewhat Very True 
True 
_____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
____ *2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
_____ 3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. 
____*4. I have not always been honest with myself 
_____5. I always know why I like things. 
____*6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
_____7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
____*8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
_____9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
____*10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
____ 11. I never regret my decisions. 
____*12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon 
enough. 
_____13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
____*14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. 
_____15. I am a completely rational person. 
____*16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
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_____17. I am very confident of my judgments. 
____*18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
____  19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
____*20. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. 
____*21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
_____22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
____*23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
_____24. I never swear. 
____*25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
_____26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. 
___  *27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. 
____  28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
____*29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or 
her. 
1 ----------- 2 ----------- 3 ----------- 4 ----------- 5 ----------- 6 -----------7 
Not True                                  Somewhat                                         Very True 
                                                      True 
 
_____ 30. I always declare everything at customs. 
____ *31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
_____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street 
____ *33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit 
_____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
____ *35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. 
____   36. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
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____ *37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really 
sick. 
_____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting 
it. 
____ *39. I have some pretty awful habits. 
_____ 40. I don’t gossip about other people’s business. 
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Appendix C 
 
Moral Identity Scale (MIS) 
  Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person:  
 Caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honesty, 
and kind.   
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else.  For a 
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics.  Imagine 
how that person would think, feel, and act.  When you have a clear image of what this person 
would be like, answer the following questions. 
 
Answer the following questions according to the following scale: 
 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
 
1)   It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.  
2)   Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
3)  A big part of my emotional well-being is tied up in having these characteristics. 
4)  I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics. 
5)  Having these characteristics is an important part of my sense of self. 
6)  I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
7)  I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics. 
8)  The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these 
characteristics. 
9)  The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in 
certain organizations. 
10)  I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these 
characteristics.   
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Appendix D 
 
Davis Interpersonal Reactivity Index (DIRI) 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations.  For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the 
appropriate letter on the scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E.  When you have 
decided on your answer, fill in the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number.  
READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING.  Answer as honestly as you can.  
Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
 
 A               B               C               D               E 
 DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
 DESCRIBE ME                                               VERY 
 WELL                                                             WELL 
 
 
1.  I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to 
me. (FS) 
 
2.  I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 
 
3.  I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT) (-) 
 
4.  Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
(EC) (-) 
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5.  I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS) 
 
6.  In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 
 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it. (FS) (-) 
 
8.  I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
 
9.  When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards 
them. (EC) 
 
10.  I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. 
(PD) 
 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their 
      perspective. (PT) 
 
12.  Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. (FS) 
(-) 
 
13.  When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-) 
 
14.  Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) 
 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
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people's 
      arguments. (PT) (-) 
 
16.  After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (FS) 
 
17.  Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD) 
 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity 
for them.  
      (EC) (-) 
 
19.  I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-) 
 
20.  I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
 
21.  I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
(PT) 
 
22.  I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
 
23.  When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
       character. (FS) 
 
24.  I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD) 
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25.  When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
(PT) 
 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. (FS) 
 
27.  When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD) 
 
28.  Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(PT) 
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
  PT = perspective-taking scale 
  FS = fantasy scale 
  EC = empathic concern scale 
  PD = personal distress scale 
 
  A = 0 
  B = 1 
  C = 2 
  D = 3 
  E = 4 
 
Except for reversed-scored items, which are scored: 
 
  A = 4 
  B = 3 
 81 
 
  C = 2 
  D = 1 
  E = 0 
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Appendix E 
 
Identification with all of Humanity Scale (IWAHS) 
1. How close do you feel to each of the following groups? 
1 = not at all close 
2= not very close 
3 = just a little or somewhat close 
4 = pretty close 
5 = very close 
a. People in my community 
b. Americans 
c. People all over the world 
2. How often do you use the word “we” to refer to the following groups of people? 
1 = almost never 
2 = rarely 
3 = occasionally 
4 = often 
5 = very often 
a. People in my community 
b. Americans 
c. People all over the world 
3. How much would you say you have in common with the following groups? 
1 = almost nothing in common 
2 = little in common 
3 = some in common 
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4 = quite a bit in common 
5 = very much in common 
a. People in my community 
b. Americans 
c. People all over the world 
Please answer all remaining questions using the following choices: 
1 = not at all 
2 = just a little 
3 = somewhat 
4 = quite a bit 
5 = very much 
Who believes that identification with all humanity is ... 49 
4. Sometimes people think of those who are not a part of their immediate family as 
“family.” To what degree do you think of the following groups of people as 
“family?” 
a. People in my community 
b. Americans 
c. All humans everywhere 
5. How much do you identify with (that is, feel a part of, feel love toward, have 
concern for) each of the following? 
a. People in my community 
b. Americans 
c. All humans everywhere 
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6. How much would you say you care (feel upset, want to help) when bad things 
happens to 
a. People in my community. 
b. Americans. 
c. People anywhere in the world. 
7. How much do you want to be: 
a. a responsible citizen of your community. 
b. a responsible American citizen. 
c. a responsible citizen of the world. 
8. How much do you believe in: 
a. being loyal to my community. 
b. being loyal to America. 
c. being loyal to all mankind. 
9. When they are in need, how much do you want to help: 
a. people in my community. 
b. Americans. 
c. people all over the world. 
*Note: When administered in other countries, that country's name may be substituted for 
"Americans." 
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Appendix F 
 
Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
 
Appendix G 
 
Revised Moral Identity Scale (RMIS) 
Instructions:  At this point, you are going to be presented with short stories regarding 
two real-life individuals who have been shown to lead extremely moral lives in terms of 
helping Jews during World War II (i.e., Tony) or helping fight for racial equality 
(Virginia).  You will be presented with their background information, in addition to the 
ways that they thought and the manner in which they led their lives.  Please read each 
story very carefully as you will be given a quiz to check your recall of information for 
each individual.  Following your reading of these stories, specific directions will be 
given. 
  
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF TONY, A DUTCH RESCUER 
 
 
Tony did not want to attend university and avoided a scene with his social-
climbing mother by enrolling in the military.  His mother’s social connections got Tony 
assigned to an elite division of cavalry officers composed primarily of aristocrats who 
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shared Tony’s support for the Dutch monarchy.  This military assignment was to change 
Tony’s life once war began. 
 After World War II had broken out, the Dutch government and the Dutch Army 
as a whole surrendered to the Germans because they were too powerful.  As a result, the 
Germans held them for about a month or so.  Then they decided it was too complicated.  
So, they let them go.  They thought that because the Dutch were Germanic, they would 
eventually join the German effort.  By the time Tony and his unit were released, they had 
already hidden some weapons and a motorcycle.  And that’s when they—some 80 Army 
officers—started a very primitive, nonviolent little resistance movement.  However, the 
Germans managed to get an address list for all of them.  They went to everybody’s home 
during curfew.  Tony was one of the lucky three who was not at home that night.  He was 
spending the night with a girlfriend.  He got a quick call from somebody saying, “Don’t 
ever go home again because they want to pick you up.”   
 The other 77 officers were all executed.  So that changed the situation.  Up until 
then, it was almost a game, this little resistance movement.  But the executions suddenly 
showed them the total realities of what the German occupation was going to be like.  
Because of this, Tony knew that he had to help others (i.e., Jewish people) who were 
being killed by the Nazi regime. 
 The determination to help Jews was never a question for rescuers like Tony.  
Helping Jews was a given, emanating from Tony’s sense of himself in relation to others.  
Although helping the Jews would be dangerous, Tony considered it a controlled risk.  
Tony thought that you have to think of your fellow man, not just yourself, for when you 
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save your fellow man, you save yourself, too.  And beyond this, Tony had risked his life 
to save other people in nonwartime situations (He had, for example, rescued 17 people 
from drowning in the Pacific Ocean after he came to the United States). 
 Tony did not think that he did anything special. He thought it was something that 
everybody normally should be doing.  That is, he thought that everyone should help one 
other.  In Tony’s own words, “It’s common sense and common caring for people.  We 
live in one world.  We are one people.  Working together, basically we are all the same.” 
 
BACKGROUND AND ACTIVITIES OF VIRGINIA, A HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACTIVIST   
 
 
Virginia Foster Durr came from a wealthy family who thought white people were 
better than African Americans.  Although this was her situation, she decided to live a life 
fighting for the welfare of minority groups.  As a youngster, she rebelled against her 
parents in terms of considering all people equal.  As a result, she was she was the least 
popular figure in her household.  While in college, financial distress, racial 
discrimination, and unpopularity resulted in her dropping out of Wellesley College.  After 
she had moved back to her hometown, Virginia met her future husband, attorney Clifford 
Durr. 
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After they had gotten married, the couple moved to Washington, D.C.  While her 
husband worked for President Roosevelt, she teamed up with the Woman’s National 
Democratic Club.  Her activism for human rights became her primary interest. 
Shortly thereafter, she considered the poll tax, which was used on African 
Americans at this time, extremely hateful.  As such, she worked side by side with various 
politicians to garner support for her legislation.  Ultimately, this resulted in the eventual 
establishment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Additionally, her work eventually 
gained enough notoriety to end the poll tax.  
Eventually, she and her husband become founding members of the Southern 
Conference on Human Welfare.  Because of Virginia and Clifford’s controversial 
positions on issues of race, they vehemently tried to stop institutionalized racism. The 
Durrs provided legal advice to African Americans and also supported the Freedom Riders 
and the Voting Rights Act. In December 1955, Virginia and her husband bailed Rosa 
Parks out of jail.  Rosa Parks, of course, was taken to jail for refusing to give up her seat 
to a white person on one of the segregated buses. Shortly thereafter, she organized the 
Montgomery bus boycott.  
Virginia also gave her support to groups that sought to pass legislation regarding 
the banning of nuclear weapons.  Overall, her life’s work included being a relief worker 
during the Great Depression, and a political lobbyist who sought to gain equal rights to 
everyone during the civil rights campaign.  *PLEASE TURN THE PAGE FOR 
FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS 
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Instructions: Now, I would like you to write down the personality traits or characteristic 
that you think you share and do not share with Tony and Virginia in the appropriate 
column.  Please limit your response to 1 full page. 
Personality traits and characteristics 
that I SHARE with Tony and Virginia: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personality traits and characteristics 
that I DO NOT SHARE with Tony and 
Virginia: 
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*PLEASE TURN THE PAGE FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person:  
 Caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, 
and kind.   
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else like Tony and 
Virginia.  For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these 
characteristics.  Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act.  If you think about 
someone like Tony or Virginia Foster Durr, you need to understand that these people are 
extremely rare.  That is, most people are not like they are.  Although people like this benefit 
humanity and make the world a better place in which to live, there are many disadvantages 
associated with this lifestyle.  For example, they may fear for their lives due to the extent of 
their actions, have nonexistent social lives, or lack the means to properly take care of the 
people they serve or their families.  When you have a clear image of what this person would 
be like, answer the following questions according to your personality characteristics.  
Although people like Tony or Virginia Foster Durr would probably indicate “strongly agree” 
to most of the questions, do not feel bad if this is not the case for you.  Remember: people 
like Tony and Virginia are rare.  So, most of us would answer differently than they would.   
Answer the following questions according to the following scale: 
 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = disagree somewhat, 4 = undecided, 5 = agree 
somewhat, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1)   It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.  
2)   Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am. 
3)  A big part of my emotional well-being is tied up in having these characteristics. 
4)  I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics. 
5)  Having these characteristics is an important part of my sense of self. 
6)  I strongly desire to have these characteristics. 
7)  I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics. 
8)  The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these 
characteristics. 
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9)  The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in 
certain organizations. 
10)  I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these 
characteristics.   
*PLEASE TURN THE PAGE FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS 
Tony and Virginia Foster Durr Quiz 
Instructions:  This is your final task.  You are going to be presented with 5 questions 
over the two short stories.  Thank you for your participation.   
1. Whom did Virginia Foster Durr bail of out of jail? 
a. Rosa Parks 
b. Martin Luther King Jr. 
c. Malcolm X 
d. None of the above 
2. During World War II, in which Army unit did Tony serve? 
a. German 
b. Dutch 
c. Italian 
d. United Kingdom 
3. Besides helping the Jews during World War II, Tony also rescued 17 people from  
a. A house fire 
b. An automobile accident 
c. Drowning in the Pacific Ocean 
d. None of the above 
4. Virginia Foster Durr’s husband was a/an 
a. Engineer 
b. Attorney 
c. Physician 
d. Teacher 
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5. Virginia Foster Durr dropped out of  
a. Bryn Mawr College 
b. Bates College 
c.  Yale University 
d. Wellesley College 
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Appendix H 
Figure 1
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Appendix I 
Human Subjects Review Board Approval 
 
